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Shared intention and the doxastic single end condition

Blomberg, Olle LU (2016) In Philosophical Studies 173(2). p.351-372
Abstract
What is required for several agents to intentionally φ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their φ-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this doxastic single end condition captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular activity if the agent believes or assumes that there is a single end that each action is directed to, so several agents’ actions are only unified into an intentional joint activity if each agent believes or assumes that there is a single end that each... (More)
What is required for several agents to intentionally φ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their φ-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this doxastic single end condition captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular activity if the agent believes or assumes that there is a single end that each action is directed to, so several agents’ actions are only unified into an intentional joint activity if each agent believes or assumes that there is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Influential accounts of intentional joint action, including Christopher Kutz's and Michael Bratman's, implicitly include this condition only if participants must intend to contribute to the end under the same conception. While such a requirement successfully rules out some counterexamples, it also makes the accounts unable to appropriately accommodate and explain clear cases of intentional joint action that they ought to be able to accommodate and explain (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Faculty of Humanities, Intentional joint action, Shared intention, Common goal, Doxastic single end condition , Christopher Kutz, Michael Bratman
in
Philosophical Studies
volume
173
issue
2
pages
351 - 372
publisher
Springer Netherlands
external identifiers
  • scopus:84955181903
ISSN
0031-8116
DOI
10.1007/s11098-015-0496-z
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
c245f801-42e1-4b6c-bca2-e5cb39a53f2d
date added to LUP
2017-07-04 14:53:32
date last changed
2017-10-16 09:21:43
@article{c245f801-42e1-4b6c-bca2-e5cb39a53f2d,
  abstract     = {What is required for several agents to intentionally φ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their φ-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this doxastic single end condition captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular activity if the agent believes or assumes that there is a single end that each action is directed to, so several agents’ actions are only unified into an intentional joint activity if each agent believes or assumes that there is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Influential accounts of intentional joint action, including Christopher Kutz's and Michael Bratman's, implicitly include this condition only if participants must intend to contribute to the end under the same conception. While such a requirement successfully rules out some counterexamples, it also makes the accounts unable to appropriately accommodate and explain clear cases of intentional joint action that they ought to be able to accommodate and explain},
  author       = {Blomberg, Olle},
  issn         = {0031-8116},
  keyword      = {Faculty of Humanities,Intentional joint action,Shared intention,Common goal,Doxastic single end condition ,Christopher Kutz,Michael Bratman},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {351--372},
  publisher    = {Springer Netherlands},
  series       = {Philosophical Studies},
  title        = {Shared intention and the doxastic single end condition},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0496-z},
  volume       = {173},
  year         = {2016},
}