An Account of Boeschian Cooperative Behaviour
Blomberg, Olle LU
(2015)
In Philosophical Studies Series
122.
p.169-184
- Abstract
- According to reductionist accounts, intentional joint action can be exhaustively analysed with concepts that are already available and anyway needed for understanding intentional singular action. Most such accounts include a condition that it must be common knowledge between the participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that causes and coordinates the joint action (a CK-condition). Without such common knowledge, the resulting joint action supposedly isn’t an intentional joint action. I argue that reductionists should reject the CK-condition. Either the CK-condition is unnecessary or else the reductionist fails to account for the target phenomenon of intentional joint action.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/c2813881-01ee-4478-8e44-37a4ed0c89e4
- author
- Blomberg, Olle
LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2015-07-01
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- host publication
- Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems : Explanation, Implementation and Simulation - Explanation, Implementation and Simulation
- series title
- Philosophical Studies Series
- editor
- Misselhorn, Catrin
- volume
- 122
- pages
- 169 - 184
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:84955128204
- ISBN
- 978-3-319-15514-2
- 978-3-319-15515-9
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-319-15515-9_9
- project
- Metaphysics and Collectivity
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- c2813881-01ee-4478-8e44-37a4ed0c89e4
- date added to LUP
- 2017-07-04 15:00:02
- date last changed
- 2024-09-30 05:25:16
@inbook{c2813881-01ee-4478-8e44-37a4ed0c89e4,
abstract = {{According to reductionist accounts, intentional joint action can be exhaustively analysed with concepts that are already available and anyway needed for understanding intentional singular action. Most such accounts include a condition that it must be common knowledge between the participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that causes and coordinates the joint action (a CK-condition). Without such common knowledge, the resulting joint action supposedly isn’t an intentional joint action. I argue that reductionists should reject the CK-condition. Either the CK-condition is unnecessary or else the reductionist fails to account for the target phenomenon of intentional joint action.}},
author = {{Blomberg, Olle}},
booktitle = {{Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems : Explanation, Implementation and Simulation}},
editor = {{Misselhorn, Catrin}},
isbn = {{978-3-319-15514-2}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{07}},
pages = {{169--184}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Philosophical Studies Series}},
title = {{An Account of Boeschian Cooperative Behaviour}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15515-9_9}},
doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-15515-9_9}},
volume = {{122}},
year = {{2015}},
}