Research on Evolutionary Game Analysis of Spatial Cooperation for Social Governance of Basin Water Pollution
Bai, Minghao ; Chen, Meilin ; Zhang, Moyuan ; Duan, Yeqing LU
and Zhou, Shenbei
(2022)
In Water (Switzerland)
14(16).
- Abstract
Given that the two institutional arrangements of government regulation and market allocation cannot effectively solve the conflict between individual and collective interests in the process of water pollution control, this work presents a useful attempt on the third institutional arrangement of environmental governance—social governance—to overcome the dilemma. Based on common pool resource theory and multi-person prisoner game analysis framework, it incorporates environmental damage function, spatial network structure, and strategy update based on a learning mechanism into the analysis framework. In addition, it constructs a set of spatial cooperative evolution game models of basin water pollution social governance, so as to test the... (More)
Given that the two institutional arrangements of government regulation and market allocation cannot effectively solve the conflict between individual and collective interests in the process of water pollution control, this work presents a useful attempt on the third institutional arrangement of environmental governance—social governance—to overcome the dilemma. Based on common pool resource theory and multi-person prisoner game analysis framework, it incorporates environmental damage function, spatial network structure, and strategy update based on a learning mechanism into the analysis framework. In addition, it constructs a set of spatial cooperative evolution game models of basin water pollution social governance, so as to test the guarantee effect of the spontaneous collective action conditions of basin polluters on the long-term survival of the new system. This work adopts the Monte Carlo numerical simulation method to conduct the simulation experiment research. The experimental results show it is possible to successfully form collective actions entirely dependent on emitters, which yet requires a large initial scale of cooperation, that is, a majority of the emitter group autonomously abides by credible commitments. In this process, transparent full information and active organizational mobilization have a positive effect on the collective action development. The organic combination can better guide emitters to abide by credible commitments to achieve the optimal collective interests. The study results can provide a theoretical and practical reference for the social governance mechanism at a large-scale basin.
(Less)
- author
- Bai, Minghao
; Chen, Meilin
; Zhang, Moyuan
; Duan, Yeqing
LU
and Zhou, Shenbei
- publishing date
- 2022-08-20
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- basin, social governance, spatial cooperative evolutionary game, water pollution
- in
- Water (Switzerland)
- volume
- 14
- issue
- 16
- article number
- 2564
- publisher
- MDPI AG
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85137407601
- ISSN
- 2073-4441
- DOI
- 10.3390/w14162564
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- additional info
- Publisher Copyright: © 2022 by the authors.
- id
- c45fb736-a215-438a-86f2-3c1e43b55e16
- date added to LUP
- 2025-05-19 09:51:45
- date last changed
- 2025-05-20 09:46:54
@article{c45fb736-a215-438a-86f2-3c1e43b55e16,
abstract = {{<p>Given that the two institutional arrangements of government regulation and market allocation cannot effectively solve the conflict between individual and collective interests in the process of water pollution control, this work presents a useful attempt on the third institutional arrangement of environmental governance—social governance—to overcome the dilemma. Based on common pool resource theory and multi-person prisoner game analysis framework, it incorporates environmental damage function, spatial network structure, and strategy update based on a learning mechanism into the analysis framework. In addition, it constructs a set of spatial cooperative evolution game models of basin water pollution social governance, so as to test the guarantee effect of the spontaneous collective action conditions of basin polluters on the long-term survival of the new system. This work adopts the Monte Carlo numerical simulation method to conduct the simulation experiment research. The experimental results show it is possible to successfully form collective actions entirely dependent on emitters, which yet requires a large initial scale of cooperation, that is, a majority of the emitter group autonomously abides by credible commitments. In this process, transparent full information and active organizational mobilization have a positive effect on the collective action development. The organic combination can better guide emitters to abide by credible commitments to achieve the optimal collective interests. The study results can provide a theoretical and practical reference for the social governance mechanism at a large-scale basin.</p>}},
author = {{Bai, Minghao and Chen, Meilin and Zhang, Moyuan and Duan, Yeqing and Zhou, Shenbei}},
issn = {{2073-4441}},
keywords = {{basin; social governance; spatial cooperative evolutionary game; water pollution}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{08}},
number = {{16}},
publisher = {{MDPI AG}},
series = {{Water (Switzerland)}},
title = {{Research on Evolutionary Game Analysis of Spatial Cooperation for Social Governance of Basin Water Pollution}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/w14162564}},
doi = {{10.3390/w14162564}},
volume = {{14}},
year = {{2022}},
}