Dimensions of conspiracy theories : toward a unifying framework
(2025) In Philosophical Psychology- Abstract
Philosophical debate on conspiracy theories divides between particularism, which argues for an evaluation of conspiracy theories on a case by case, and generalism, which treats them — as a class — as inherently irrational. This divide complicates how we interpret empirical research on conspiracy theory belief. Many psychological and social-scientific studies emphasize correlations between conspiracy belief and traits such as narcissism, illusory pattern perception, and paranoia, seemingly supporting a generalist view. Yet conspiracy belief is also widespread in the general population, a fact that is difficult to reconcile with a purely pathological account. A unified explanation of what motivates conspiracy belief is still lacking. I... (More)
Philosophical debate on conspiracy theories divides between particularism, which argues for an evaluation of conspiracy theories on a case by case, and generalism, which treats them — as a class — as inherently irrational. This divide complicates how we interpret empirical research on conspiracy theory belief. Many psychological and social-scientific studies emphasize correlations between conspiracy belief and traits such as narcissism, illusory pattern perception, and paranoia, seemingly supporting a generalist view. Yet conspiracy belief is also widespread in the general population, a fact that is difficult to reconcile with a purely pathological account. A unified explanation of what motivates conspiracy belief is still lacking. I address this gap by introducing a framework that incorporates multiple dimensions of conspiracy belief. The framework identifies three core motivations: group cohesion, cognitive needs, and truth-seeking. I propose that generalists and particularists each focus on different regions of this shared motivational space. I also outline a relatively narrow area within the space where pathological conspiracy belief is best located. Ultimately, however, determining where most conspiracy theories fall — and what reasons people have for endorsing them — remains an empirical question.
(Less)
- author
- Tsapos, Melina LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2025
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- in press
- subject
- keywords
- Conspiracy theories, epistemology, generalism, motivated reasoning, particularism, social psychology
- in
- Philosophical Psychology
- publisher
- Taylor & Francis
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:105025709595
- ISSN
- 0951-5089
- DOI
- 10.1080/09515089.2025.2604083
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- c835ba47-d4be-4e62-b688-fcbc7e965107
- date added to LUP
- 2026-02-23 13:49:10
- date last changed
- 2026-02-23 13:49:10
@article{c835ba47-d4be-4e62-b688-fcbc7e965107,
abstract = {{<p>Philosophical debate on conspiracy theories divides between particularism, which argues for an evaluation of conspiracy theories on a case by case, and generalism, which treats them — as a class — as inherently irrational. This divide complicates how we interpret empirical research on conspiracy theory belief. Many psychological and social-scientific studies emphasize correlations between conspiracy belief and traits such as narcissism, illusory pattern perception, and paranoia, seemingly supporting a generalist view. Yet conspiracy belief is also widespread in the general population, a fact that is difficult to reconcile with a purely pathological account. A unified explanation of what motivates conspiracy belief is still lacking. I address this gap by introducing a framework that incorporates multiple dimensions of conspiracy belief. The framework identifies three core motivations: group cohesion, cognitive needs, and truth-seeking. I propose that generalists and particularists each focus on different regions of this shared motivational space. I also outline a relatively narrow area within the space where pathological conspiracy belief is best located. Ultimately, however, determining where most conspiracy theories fall — and what reasons people have for endorsing them — remains an empirical question.</p>}},
author = {{Tsapos, Melina}},
issn = {{0951-5089}},
keywords = {{Conspiracy theories; epistemology; generalism; motivated reasoning; particularism; social psychology}},
language = {{eng}},
publisher = {{Taylor & Francis}},
series = {{Philosophical Psychology}},
title = {{Dimensions of conspiracy theories : toward a unifying framework}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2025.2604083}},
doi = {{10.1080/09515089.2025.2604083}},
year = {{2025}},
}