Truth-Predicates Still Not like Pronouns : a Reply to Salis
Båve, Arvid LU
(2019)
In Philosophia
47(5).
p.1421-1429
- Abstract
- I here respond to Pietro Salis’s objections against my original critique of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT). In addition, I clarify some points regarding the relationship between anaphoric relationships and “general semantic notions” like “equivalence”, “consequence”, and “sameness of content”, and make some further points about (PT)’s ability gto explain pragmatic and expressive features of “true”.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/c853409f-a3eb-490d-bc56-9eff659b9d80
- author
- Båve, Arvid
LU
- publishing date
- 2019-11-01
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Philosophia
- volume
- 47
- issue
- 5
- pages
- 1421 - 1429
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85066027541
- ISSN
- 0048-3893
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11406-019-00081-9
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- c853409f-a3eb-490d-bc56-9eff659b9d80
- date added to LUP
- 2021-11-09 11:39:15
- date last changed
- 2023-06-29 04:18:37
@article{c853409f-a3eb-490d-bc56-9eff659b9d80,
abstract = {{I here respond to Pietro Salis’s objections against my original critique of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT). In addition, I clarify some points regarding the relationship between anaphoric relationships and “general semantic notions” like “equivalence”, “consequence”, and “sameness of content”, and make some further points about (PT)’s ability gto explain pragmatic and expressive features of “true”.}},
author = {{Båve, Arvid}},
issn = {{0048-3893}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{11}},
number = {{5}},
pages = {{1421--1429}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Philosophia}},
title = {{Truth-Predicates Still Not like Pronouns : a Reply to Salis}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00081-9}},
doi = {{10.1007/s11406-019-00081-9}},
volume = {{47}},
year = {{2019}},
}