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Punishment, Consent and Value

Alm, David LU (2018) In Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21(4). p.903-914
Abstract

In this paper I take another look at the view, defended by C. Nino, that we may punish criminals because, by knowingly breaking a law, they have consented to becoming liable to the prescribed punishment. I will first rebut the criticisms usually aimed at this view in the literature, aiming to show that they are inconclusive. They are all efforts to show that criminal offenders in fact do not consent to becoming liable to punishment simply by committing crimes. I then turn to a different line of criticism, which I find more promising. I argue that the moral power of effecting normative changes by consenting reflects the power holder’s value as a person, and show how this idea makes sense of how refusal to recognize that power wrongs a... (More)

In this paper I take another look at the view, defended by C. Nino, that we may punish criminals because, by knowingly breaking a law, they have consented to becoming liable to the prescribed punishment. I will first rebut the criticisms usually aimed at this view in the literature, aiming to show that they are inconclusive. They are all efforts to show that criminal offenders in fact do not consent to becoming liable to punishment simply by committing crimes. I then turn to a different line of criticism, which I find more promising. I argue that the moral power of effecting normative changes by consenting reflects the power holder’s value as a person, and show how this idea makes sense of how refusal to recognize that power wrongs a person. I then argue that the “power” of consenting to punishability does not fit that model, and is better explained as reflecting the value of other people, whom the offender has wronged. Hence the power of consenting is not involved in typical cases of wrongdoing.

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Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Consent, Nino, Punishment, Rights
in
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
volume
21
issue
4
pages
903 - 914
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • scopus:85053246621
ISSN
1386-2820
DOI
10.1007/s10677-018-9926-2
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
ca967267-dd08-40c4-a17e-ddf0962cafbc
date added to LUP
2018-10-22 11:51:45
date last changed
2019-02-20 11:32:37
@article{ca967267-dd08-40c4-a17e-ddf0962cafbc,
  abstract     = {<p>In this paper I take another look at the view, defended by C. Nino, that we may punish criminals because, by knowingly breaking a law, they have consented to becoming liable to the prescribed punishment. I will first rebut the criticisms usually aimed at this view in the literature, aiming to show that they are inconclusive. They are all efforts to show that criminal offenders in fact do not consent to becoming liable to punishment simply by committing crimes. I then turn to a different line of criticism, which I find more promising. I argue that the moral power of effecting normative changes by consenting reflects the power holder’s value as a person, and show how this idea makes sense of how refusal to recognize that power wrongs a person. I then argue that the “power” of consenting to punishability does not fit that model, and is better explained as reflecting the value of other people, whom the offender has wronged. Hence the power of consenting is not involved in typical cases of wrongdoing.</p>},
  author       = {Alm, David},
  issn         = {1386-2820},
  keyword      = {Consent,Nino,Punishment,Rights},
  language     = {eng},
  month        = {08},
  number       = {4},
  pages        = {903--914},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Ethical Theory and Moral Practice},
  title        = {Punishment, Consent and Value},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9926-2},
  volume       = {21},
  year         = {2018},
}