‘All Signs Indicate that Gestapo Agents Murdered Him’: Soviet Disinformation, the Katyn massacre and the Raoul Wallenberg Case, 1945–7
(2016) In International History Review 38(1). p.148-173- Abstract
- In the years 1945–52, that is, between Raoul Wallenberg's incarceration in the Lubianka prison in Moscow (6 February 1945) and the first Swedish demand for his return (11 February 1952), more than fifty people provided the Swedish Foreign Ministry with diffuse and often contradictory information about his whereabouts. This article argues that a number of these testimonies may have been part of a Soviet campaign of disinformation aimed at diverting the Swedes' attention away from Moscow and to have them believe that Wallenberg had died in Hungary. The appearance of messages to this effect by February–March 1945 may indicate that the Soviets had already decided at this early point never to let Wallenberg return alive, or at least to... (More)
- In the years 1945–52, that is, between Raoul Wallenberg's incarceration in the Lubianka prison in Moscow (6 February 1945) and the first Swedish demand for his return (11 February 1952), more than fifty people provided the Swedish Foreign Ministry with diffuse and often contradictory information about his whereabouts. This article argues that a number of these testimonies may have been part of a Soviet campaign of disinformation aimed at diverting the Swedes' attention away from Moscow and to have them believe that Wallenberg had died in Hungary. The appearance of messages to this effect by February–March 1945 may indicate that the Soviets had already decided at this early point never to let Wallenberg return alive, or at least to construct an option that would allow for such a decision. In August 1947, after twenty-six Swedish diplomatic approaches on account of Wallenberg over the course of two and a half years, the Soviets handed over a note signed by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinskii that declared that Wallenberg had presumably died in Hungary. The note had the desired effect. No Swedish diplomatic approaches on Wallenberg were made for the next five years. This article argues that the Vyshinskii note was an extraordinary measure taken by the Soviets finally to get the message of Wallenberg's death in Hungary through to the Swedes. The Soviet disinformation regarding the 1940 Katyn massacre provides an interesting point of reference for understanding the way in which the Soviets tried to mislead Sweden over Wallenberg.
(Less) - Abstract (Swedish)
- In the years 194552, that is, between Raoul Wallenberg’s incarceration in the
Lubianka prison in Moscow (6 February 1945) and the first Swedish demand for
his return (11 February 1952), more than fifty people provided the Swedish
Foreign Ministry with diffuse and often contradictory information about his
whereabouts. This article argues that a number of these testimonies may have
been part of a Soviet campaign of disinformation aimed at diverting the Swedes’
attention away from Moscow and to have them believe that Wallenberg had died
in Hungary. The appearance of messages to this effect by FebruaryMarch 1945
may indicate that the Soviets had already decided at this early point never to let
Wallenberg... (More) - In the years 194552, that is, between Raoul Wallenberg’s incarceration in the
Lubianka prison in Moscow (6 February 1945) and the first Swedish demand for
his return (11 February 1952), more than fifty people provided the Swedish
Foreign Ministry with diffuse and often contradictory information about his
whereabouts. This article argues that a number of these testimonies may have
been part of a Soviet campaign of disinformation aimed at diverting the Swedes’
attention away from Moscow and to have them believe that Wallenberg had died
in Hungary. The appearance of messages to this effect by FebruaryMarch 1945
may indicate that the Soviets had already decided at this early point never to let
Wallenberg return alive, or at least to construct an option that would allow for
such a decision. In August 1947, after twenty-six Swedish diplomatic approaches
on account of Wallenberg over the course of two and a half years, the Soviets
handed over a note signed by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinskii that
declared that Wallenberg had presumably died in Hungary. The note had the
desired effect. No Swedish diplomatic approaches on Wallenberg were made for
the next five years. This article argues that the Vyshinskii note was an
extraordinary measure taken by the Soviets finally to get the message of
Wallenberg’s death in Hungary through to the Swedes. The Soviet disinformation
regarding the 1940 Katyn massacre provides an interesting point of reference for
understanding the way in which the Soviets tried to mislead Sweden over
Wallenberg. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/cbae41eb-dc01-4f13-b0eb-e391df3cdf44
- author
- Matz, Johan LU
- publishing date
- 2016
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- International History Review
- volume
- 38
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 25 pages
- publisher
- Taylor & Francis
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:84924514000
- ISSN
- 0707-5332
- DOI
- 10.1080/07075332.2015.1016994
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- cbae41eb-dc01-4f13-b0eb-e391df3cdf44
- alternative location
- https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07075332.2015.1016994
- date added to LUP
- 2022-03-18 12:00:32
- date last changed
- 2023-03-06 14:14:27
@article{cbae41eb-dc01-4f13-b0eb-e391df3cdf44,
abstract = {{In the years 1945–52, that is, between Raoul Wallenberg's incarceration in the Lubianka prison in Moscow (6 February 1945) and the first Swedish demand for his return (11 February 1952), more than fifty people provided the Swedish Foreign Ministry with diffuse and often contradictory information about his whereabouts. This article argues that a number of these testimonies may have been part of a Soviet campaign of disinformation aimed at diverting the Swedes' attention away from Moscow and to have them believe that Wallenberg had died in Hungary. The appearance of messages to this effect by February–March 1945 may indicate that the Soviets had already decided at this early point never to let Wallenberg return alive, or at least to construct an option that would allow for such a decision. In August 1947, after twenty-six Swedish diplomatic approaches on account of Wallenberg over the course of two and a half years, the Soviets handed over a note signed by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinskii that declared that Wallenberg had presumably died in Hungary. The note had the desired effect. No Swedish diplomatic approaches on Wallenberg were made for the next five years. This article argues that the Vyshinskii note was an extraordinary measure taken by the Soviets finally to get the message of Wallenberg's death in Hungary through to the Swedes. The Soviet disinformation regarding the 1940 Katyn massacre provides an interesting point of reference for understanding the way in which the Soviets tried to mislead Sweden over Wallenberg.<br/><br/>}},
author = {{Matz, Johan}},
issn = {{0707-5332}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{148--173}},
publisher = {{Taylor & Francis}},
series = {{International History Review}},
title = {{‘All Signs Indicate that Gestapo Agents Murdered Him’: Soviet Disinformation, the Katyn massacre and the Raoul Wallenberg Case, 1945–7}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2015.1016994}},
doi = {{10.1080/07075332.2015.1016994}},
volume = {{38}},
year = {{2016}},
}