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Voting Procedures for Complex Collective Decision

Rabinowicz, Wlodek LU and Bovens, Luc (2004) In Ratio Juris 17(2). p.241-258
Abstract
it can let the committee members vote on each sub-question and then use the outcomes as premises for its conclusion on the main issue (premise based-procedure, pbp), or it can let the members directly vote on the conclusion (conclusion-based procedure, cbp). The procedures can lead to different results, but which of them is a better truth-tracker? On the basis of Condorcet's jury theorem, we show that the pbp is clearly superior if the objective is to reach truth for the right (= correct) reasons. However, if the goal instead is to reach truth for whatever reasons, right or wrong, there will be cases in which using the cbp turns out to be more reliable, even though, for the most part, the pbp will retain its superiority. In that... (More)
it can let the committee members vote on each sub-question and then use the outcomes as premises for its conclusion on the main issue (premise based-procedure, pbp), or it can let the members directly vote on the conclusion (conclusion-based procedure, cbp). The procedures can lead to different results, but which of them is a better truth-tracker? On the basis of Condorcet's jury theorem, we show that the pbp is clearly superior if the objective is to reach truth for the right (= correct) reasons. However, if the goal instead is to reach truth for whatever reasons, right or wrong, there will be cases in which using the cbp turns out to be more reliable, even though, for the most part, the pbp will retain its superiority. In that connection, we also consider the truth-tracking potential of a 'sophisticated' variant of the pbp, which is sensitive to the size of the majorities supporting each of the premises (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Condorcet premise based-procedure conclusion-based procedure
in
Ratio Juris
volume
17
issue
2
pages
241 - 258
publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN
0952-1917
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9337.2004.00266.x
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
ce1c4a9a-05c6-4481-8464-02173187c6e8 (old id 144309)
date added to LUP
2007-07-27 08:46:17
date last changed
2016-04-16 04:47:02
@article{ce1c4a9a-05c6-4481-8464-02173187c6e8,
  abstract     = {it can let the committee members vote on each sub-question and then use the outcomes as premises for its conclusion on the main issue (premise based-procedure, pbp), or it can let the members directly vote on the conclusion (conclusion-based procedure, cbp). The procedures can lead to different results, but which of them is a better truth-tracker? On the basis of Condorcet's jury theorem, we show that the pbp is clearly superior if the objective is to reach truth for the right (= correct) reasons. However, if the goal instead is to reach truth for whatever reasons, right or wrong, there will be cases in which using the cbp turns out to be more reliable, even though, for the most part, the pbp will retain its superiority. In that connection, we also consider the truth-tracking potential of a 'sophisticated' variant of the pbp, which is sensitive to the size of the majorities supporting each of the premises},
  author       = {Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Bovens, Luc},
  issn         = {0952-1917},
  keyword      = {Condorcet
premise based-procedure
conclusion-based procedure},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {241--258},
  publisher    = {Wiley-Blackwell},
  series       = {Ratio Juris},
  title        = {Voting Procedures for Complex Collective Decision},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2004.00266.x},
  volume       = {17},
  year         = {2004},
}