Strawson’s Inescapability Claim : Metaphysical, not Psychological
Emilsson, Anton LU
(2025)
In Journal of the American Philosophical Association
- Abstract
At the heart of P. F. Strawson’s naturalistic approach to responsibility sits the Inescapability Claim. The main argument of this article is that the established interpretation of this claim is mistaken. According to, what I will call, the Standard Reading, it is the empirical claim that it is psychologically impossible for us to abandon our responsibility practices. Although widespread, this reading lacks interpretative basis, is in conflict with other features of Strawson’s approach, and is—most strikingly—explicitly rejected by Strawson himself. In its place, I propose that we understand Strawson’s Inescapability Claim as the metaphysical claim that the concept of responsibility is among those ineliminable concepts that form the... (More)
At the heart of P. F. Strawson’s naturalistic approach to responsibility sits the Inescapability Claim. The main argument of this article is that the established interpretation of this claim is mistaken. According to, what I will call, the Standard Reading, it is the empirical claim that it is psychologically impossible for us to abandon our responsibility practices. Although widespread, this reading lacks interpretative basis, is in conflict with other features of Strawson’s approach, and is—most strikingly—explicitly rejected by Strawson himself. In its place, I propose that we understand Strawson’s Inescapability Claim as the metaphysical claim that the concept of responsibility is among those ineliminable concepts that form the fundamental core of any conceivable conceptual scheme. The responsibility skeptic’s doubt is “idle, unreal, a pretense”, not because their doubt is psychologically inefficacious, but because it treads beyond the bounds of sense; their doubt is, in a particular sense, inconceivable or unintelligible.
(Less)
- author
- Emilsson, Anton
LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2025
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- epub
- subject
- keywords
- Free Will, Free Will Skepticism, Moral Responsibility, P. F. Strawson, Reactive Attitudes
- in
- Journal of the American Philosophical Association
- publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:105018928267
- ISSN
- 2053-4477
- DOI
- 10.1017/apa.2025.10015
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- additional info
- Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s), 2025. Published by.
- id
- cf1251fb-0b66-4f1b-a783-e3d794483e21
- date added to LUP
- 2026-01-22 13:51:41
- date last changed
- 2026-01-22 13:52:00
@article{cf1251fb-0b66-4f1b-a783-e3d794483e21,
abstract = {{<p>At the heart of P. F. Strawson’s naturalistic approach to responsibility sits the Inescapability Claim. The main argument of this article is that the established interpretation of this claim is mistaken. According to, what I will call, the Standard Reading, it is the empirical claim that it is psychologically impossible for us to abandon our responsibility practices. Although widespread, this reading lacks interpretative basis, is in conflict with other features of Strawson’s approach, and is—most strikingly—explicitly rejected by Strawson himself. In its place, I propose that we understand Strawson’s Inescapability Claim as the metaphysical claim that the concept of responsibility is among those ineliminable concepts that form the fundamental core of any conceivable conceptual scheme. The responsibility skeptic’s doubt is “idle, unreal, a pretense”, not because their doubt is psychologically inefficacious, but because it treads beyond the bounds of sense; their doubt is, in a particular sense, inconceivable or unintelligible.</p>}},
author = {{Emilsson, Anton}},
issn = {{2053-4477}},
keywords = {{Free Will; Free Will Skepticism; Moral Responsibility; P. F. Strawson; Reactive Attitudes}},
language = {{eng}},
publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}},
series = {{Journal of the American Philosophical Association}},
title = {{Strawson’s Inescapability Claim : Metaphysical, not Psychological}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2025.10015}},
doi = {{10.1017/apa.2025.10015}},
year = {{2025}},
}