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The inverse conjunction fallacy

Jönsson, Martin LU and Hampton, James A. (2006) In Journal of Memory and Language 55(3). p.317-334
Abstract
If people believe that some property is true of all members of a class such as sofas, then they should also believe that the same property is true of all members of a conjunctively defined subset of that class such as uncomfortable handmade sofas. A series of experiments demonstrated a failure to observe this constraint, leading to what is termed the inverse conjunction fallacy. Not only did people often express a belief in the more general statement but not in the more specific, but also when they accepted both beliefs, they were inclined to give greater confidence to the more general. It is argued that this effect underlies a number of other demonstrations of fallacious reasoning, particularly in category-based induction. Alternative... (More)
If people believe that some property is true of all members of a class such as sofas, then they should also believe that the same property is true of all members of a conjunctively defined subset of that class such as uncomfortable handmade sofas. A series of experiments demonstrated a failure to observe this constraint, leading to what is termed the inverse conjunction fallacy. Not only did people often express a belief in the more general statement but not in the more specific, but also when they accepted both beliefs, they were inclined to give greater confidence to the more general. It is argued that this effect underlies a number of other demonstrations of fallacious reasoning, particularly in category-based induction. Alternative accounts of the phenomenon are evaluated, and it is concluded that the effect is best interpreted in terms of intensional reasoning [Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293-315.]. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
intensional reasoning, beliefs, concepts, fallacy, conjunction, similarity
in
Journal of Memory and Language
volume
55
issue
3
pages
317 - 334
publisher
Elsevier
external identifiers
  • wos:000240566900001
  • scopus:33747797976
ISSN
0749-596X
DOI
10.1016/j.jml.2006.06.005
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
cf8fbe58-e4f9-41d1-a88f-7c5ed73fa836 (old id 393035)
date added to LUP
2016-04-01 16:14:14
date last changed
2019-05-28 02:19:24
@article{cf8fbe58-e4f9-41d1-a88f-7c5ed73fa836,
  abstract     = {If people believe that some property is true of all members of a class such as sofas, then they should also believe that the same property is true of all members of a conjunctively defined subset of that class such as uncomfortable handmade sofas. A series of experiments demonstrated a failure to observe this constraint, leading to what is termed the inverse conjunction fallacy. Not only did people often express a belief in the more general statement but not in the more specific, but also when they accepted both beliefs, they were inclined to give greater confidence to the more general. It is argued that this effect underlies a number of other demonstrations of fallacious reasoning, particularly in category-based induction. Alternative accounts of the phenomenon are evaluated, and it is concluded that the effect is best interpreted in terms of intensional reasoning [Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293-315.].},
  author       = {Jönsson, Martin and Hampton, James A.},
  issn         = {0749-596X},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {3},
  pages        = {317--334},
  publisher    = {Elsevier},
  series       = {Journal of Memory and Language},
  title        = {The inverse conjunction fallacy},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2006.06.005},
  doi          = {10.1016/j.jml.2006.06.005},
  volume       = {55},
  year         = {2006},
}