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Cryptanalysis of the Gemmell and Naor Multiround Authentication Protocol

Gehrmann, Christian LU (1994) 14th annual cryptographic conference CRYPTO '94 In Lecture Notes in Computer Science 839. p.121-128
Abstract
Gemmell and Naor proposed a new protocol for the authentication of long messages which was based on block codes and which used a transmission channel k times. This multiround authentication makes it possible to limit the key size independently of the message length. We propose a new attack and show that the probability analysis made by Gemmell and Naor, which was only based on the minimum distance property of the codes, does not hold for our attack. Considering also the impersonation attack we conclude that the number of rounds have to be odd.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Hash functions, Block code, Impersonation attack, Message length
host publication
CRYPTO '94
series title
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
editor
Desmedt, Yvo
volume
839
edition
IACR
pages
7 pages
publisher
Springer
conference name
14th annual cryptographic conference CRYPTO '94
conference location
Santa Barbara, United States
conference dates
1994-08-21 - 1994-08-25
external identifiers
  • scopus:1842755386
ISBN
978-3-540-58333-2
978-3-540-48658-9
DOI
10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
d2b99f98-cd91-43c5-bde0-93ef605aefb8
date added to LUP
2018-09-14 10:28:29
date last changed
2024-05-28 15:30:59
@inproceedings{d2b99f98-cd91-43c5-bde0-93ef605aefb8,
  abstract     = {{Gemmell and Naor proposed a new protocol for the authentication of long messages which was based on block codes and which used a transmission channel k times. This multiround authentication makes it possible to limit the key size independently of the message length. We propose a new attack and show that the probability analysis made by Gemmell and Naor, which was only based on the minimum distance property of the codes, does not hold for our attack. Considering also the impersonation attack we conclude that the number of rounds have to be odd.}},
  author       = {{Gehrmann, Christian}},
  booktitle    = {{CRYPTO '94}},
  editor       = {{Desmedt, Yvo}},
  isbn         = {{978-3-540-58333-2}},
  keywords     = {{Hash functions; Block code; Impersonation attack; Message length}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  month        = {{08}},
  pages        = {{121--128}},
  publisher    = {{Springer}},
  series       = {{Lecture Notes in Computer Science}},
  title        = {{Cryptanalysis of the Gemmell and Naor Multiround Authentication Protocol}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14}},
  volume       = {{839}},
  year         = {{1994}},
}