Cryptanalysis of the Gemmell and Naor Multiround Authentication Protocol
(1994) 14th annual cryptographic conference CRYPTO '94 In Lecture Notes in Computer Science 839. p.121-128- Abstract
- Gemmell and Naor proposed a new protocol for the authentication of long messages which was based on block codes and which used a transmission channel k times. This multiround authentication makes it possible to limit the key size independently of the message length. We propose a new attack and show that the probability analysis made by Gemmell and Naor, which was only based on the minimum distance property of the codes, does not hold for our attack. Considering also the impersonation attack we conclude that the number of rounds have to be odd.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/d2b99f98-cd91-43c5-bde0-93ef605aefb8
- author
- Gehrmann, Christian LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 1994-08-21
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Hash functions, Block code, Impersonation attack, Message length
- host publication
- CRYPTO '94
- series title
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- editor
- Desmedt, Yvo
- volume
- 839
- edition
- IACR
- pages
- 7 pages
- publisher
- Springer
- conference name
- 14th annual cryptographic conference CRYPTO '94
- conference location
- Santa Barbara, United States
- conference dates
- 1994-08-21 - 1994-08-25
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:1842755386
- ISBN
- 978-3-540-58333-2
- 978-3-540-48658-9
- DOI
- 10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- d2b99f98-cd91-43c5-bde0-93ef605aefb8
- date added to LUP
- 2018-09-14 10:28:29
- date last changed
- 2024-05-28 15:30:59
@inproceedings{d2b99f98-cd91-43c5-bde0-93ef605aefb8, abstract = {{Gemmell and Naor proposed a new protocol for the authentication of long messages which was based on block codes and which used a transmission channel k times. This multiround authentication makes it possible to limit the key size independently of the message length. We propose a new attack and show that the probability analysis made by Gemmell and Naor, which was only based on the minimum distance property of the codes, does not hold for our attack. Considering also the impersonation attack we conclude that the number of rounds have to be odd.}}, author = {{Gehrmann, Christian}}, booktitle = {{CRYPTO '94}}, editor = {{Desmedt, Yvo}}, isbn = {{978-3-540-58333-2}}, keywords = {{Hash functions; Block code; Impersonation attack; Message length}}, language = {{eng}}, month = {{08}}, pages = {{121--128}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, series = {{Lecture Notes in Computer Science}}, title = {{Cryptanalysis of the Gemmell and Naor Multiround Authentication Protocol}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14}}, doi = {{10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14}}, volume = {{839}}, year = {{1994}}, }