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Common Knowledge and Reductionism about Shared Agency

Blomberg, Olle LU (2016) In Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94(2). p.315-326
Abstract
Most reductionist accounts of intentional joint action include a condition that it must be common knowledge between participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that cause and coordinate the joint action. However, this condition has typically simply been taken for granted rather than argued for. The condition is not necessary for ensuring that participants are jointly responsible for the action in which each participates, nor for ensuring that each treats the others as partners rather than as social tools. It is thus something of a mystery why the condition is so widely accepted. By rejecting three arguments that could potentially support it, I argue that reductionists should get rid of the condition. I show that two of the... (More)
Most reductionist accounts of intentional joint action include a condition that it must be common knowledge between participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that cause and coordinate the joint action. However, this condition has typically simply been taken for granted rather than argued for. The condition is not necessary for ensuring that participants are jointly responsible for the action in which each participates, nor for ensuring that each treats the others as partners rather than as social tools. It is thus something of a mystery why the condition is so widely accepted. By rejecting three arguments that could potentially support it, I argue that reductionists should get rid of the condition. I show that two of the arguments fail. While the third argument is intuitively compelling, it builds on key premises that are unavailable to the reductionist. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
intentional joint action, shared intention, common knowledge, joint responsibility, agential knowledge, openness
in
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
volume
94
issue
2
pages
315 - 326
publisher
Routledge
external identifiers
  • scopus:84935504896
ISSN
0004-8402
DOI
10.1080/00048402.2015.1055581
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
d748fd59-27f1-482d-8dc3-9c748ef6e3e1
date added to LUP
2017-07-04 14:58:52
date last changed
2017-10-16 09:30:17
@article{d748fd59-27f1-482d-8dc3-9c748ef6e3e1,
  abstract     = {Most reductionist accounts of intentional joint action include a condition that it must be common knowledge between participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that cause and coordinate the joint action. However, this condition has typically simply been taken for granted rather than argued for. The condition is not necessary for ensuring that participants are jointly responsible for the action in which each participates, nor for ensuring that each treats the others as partners rather than as social tools. It is thus something of a mystery why the condition is so widely accepted. By rejecting three arguments that could potentially support it, I argue that reductionists should get rid of the condition. I show that two of the arguments fail. While the third argument is intuitively compelling, it builds on key premises that are unavailable to the reductionist.},
  author       = {Blomberg, Olle},
  issn         = {0004-8402},
  keyword      = {intentional joint action,shared intention,common knowledge,joint responsibility,agential knowledge,openness},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {315--326},
  publisher    = {Routledge},
  series       = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
  title        = {Common Knowledge and Reductionism about Shared Agency},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2015.1055581},
  volume       = {94},
  year         = {2016},
}