Advanced

The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way

Garcia, Andrés G. LU (2019) In Philosophia (United States) 47(3). p.681-692
Abstract

Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal value. The former accrues to objects that are good as the kinds of things that they are, while the latter accrues to objects that are good for someone. Substantive examples are offered in support of the idea that these types of value can come in final or instrumental... (More)

Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal value. The former accrues to objects that are good as the kinds of things that they are, while the latter accrues to objects that are good for someone. Substantive examples are offered in support of the idea that these types of value can come in final or instrumental form. The substantive examples are then given additional support by considering the structure and behavior of fitting attitudes.

(Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Final value, Fitting attitudes, Instrumental value, Kind-value, Personal value
in
Philosophia (United States)
volume
47
issue
3
pages
681 - 692
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • scopus:85053264959
ISSN
0048-3893
DOI
10.1007/s11406-018-0019-1
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
de3ed3bc-09d0-4b51-b0ee-bc89149cfb02
date added to LUP
2018-10-22 11:33:26
date last changed
2019-11-25 09:24:21
@article{de3ed3bc-09d0-4b51-b0ee-bc89149cfb02,
  abstract     = {<p>Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal value. The former accrues to objects that are good as the kinds of things that they are, while the latter accrues to objects that are good for someone. Substantive examples are offered in support of the idea that these types of value can come in final or instrumental form. The substantive examples are then given additional support by considering the structure and behavior of fitting attitudes.</p>},
  author       = {Garcia, Andrés G.},
  issn         = {0048-3893},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {3},
  pages        = {681--692},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Philosophia (United States)},
  title        = {The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-0019-1},
  doi          = {10.1007/s11406-018-0019-1},
  volume       = {47},
  year         = {2019},
}