The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way
(2019) In Philosophia 47(3). p.681-692- Abstract
Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal value. The former accrues to objects that are good as the kinds of things that they are, while the latter accrues to objects that are good for someone. Substantive examples are offered in support of the idea that these types of value can come in final or instrumental... (More)
Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal value. The former accrues to objects that are good as the kinds of things that they are, while the latter accrues to objects that are good for someone. Substantive examples are offered in support of the idea that these types of value can come in final or instrumental form. The substantive examples are then given additional support by considering the structure and behavior of fitting attitudes.
(Less)
- author
- Garcia, Andrés G. LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2019
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Final value, Fitting attitudes, Instrumental value, Kind-value, Personal value
- in
- Philosophia
- volume
- 47
- issue
- 3
- pages
- 681 - 692
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85053264959
- ISSN
- 0048-3893
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11406-018-0019-1
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- de3ed3bc-09d0-4b51-b0ee-bc89149cfb02
- date added to LUP
- 2018-10-22 11:33:26
- date last changed
- 2022-04-25 18:20:18
@article{de3ed3bc-09d0-4b51-b0ee-bc89149cfb02,
abstract = {{<p>Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal value. The former accrues to objects that are good as the kinds of things that they are, while the latter accrues to objects that are good for someone. Substantive examples are offered in support of the idea that these types of value can come in final or instrumental form. The substantive examples are then given additional support by considering the structure and behavior of fitting attitudes.</p>}},
author = {{Garcia, Andrés G.}},
issn = {{0048-3893}},
keywords = {{Final value; Fitting attitudes; Instrumental value; Kind-value; Personal value}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{3}},
pages = {{681--692}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Philosophia}},
title = {{The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-0019-1}},
doi = {{10.1007/s11406-018-0019-1}},
volume = {{47}},
year = {{2019}},
}