Should We Worry About Conspiracy Theorists Rejecting Experts?
(2024) In Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy- Abstract
- Concerns have been raised by both researchers and authorities regarding conspiracy theorists rejecting experts. To address the validity of these concerns, we need to delve into two key inquiries regarding who qualifies as an expert on conspiracy theories, and what constitutes an epistemically rational response (from a conspiracy theorist) when faced with expert testimony. The first inquiry presents a challenge when considering a reputationalist versus a realist account of experts. On the reputationalist account rejecting experts may be viewed as little more than rejecting those whom society has collectively deemed as experts. Alternatively, adopting a realist account raises the challenge of determining who the genuine experts are. I argue... (More)
- Concerns have been raised by both researchers and authorities regarding conspiracy theorists rejecting experts. To address the validity of these concerns, we need to delve into two key inquiries regarding who qualifies as an expert on conspiracy theories, and what constitutes an epistemically rational response (from a conspiracy theorist) when faced with expert testimony. The first inquiry presents a challenge when considering a reputationalist versus a realist account of experts. On the reputationalist account rejecting experts may be viewed as little more than rejecting those whom society has collectively deemed as experts. Alternatively, adopting a realist account raises the challenge of determining who the genuine experts are. I argue that the realist account is the more compelling option for pursuing the first question. Moreover, I explore two prevalent accounts from existing literature that prescribe how epistemic agents should respond to expert testimony: the Preemptive View and the Community View. Through an examination using the simulation program Laputa, I demonstrate that both accounts are insufficient. Consequently, I argue that without a clear identification of experts in the broader context of conspiracy theories, the initial concern lacks a solid foundation, and the sense of urgency may be unwarranted. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/e3a4a50b-09b1-4ed0-9f37-94f7bdb0d08f
- author
- Tsapos, Melina LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2024
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- epub
- subject
- keywords
- Experts, conspiracy theory, conspiracy theorist, Laputa simulation program, epistemic networks
- in
- Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
- pages
- 21 pages
- publisher
- Routledge
- ISSN
- 0020-174X
- DOI
- 10.1080/0020174X.2024.2375774
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- e3a4a50b-09b1-4ed0-9f37-94f7bdb0d08f
- date added to LUP
- 2024-07-13 09:20:40
- date last changed
- 2024-07-15 14:41:10
@article{e3a4a50b-09b1-4ed0-9f37-94f7bdb0d08f,
abstract = {{Concerns have been raised by both researchers and authorities regarding conspiracy theorists rejecting experts. To address the validity of these concerns, we need to delve into two key inquiries regarding who qualifies as an expert on conspiracy theories, and what constitutes an epistemically rational response (from a conspiracy theorist) when faced with expert testimony. The first inquiry presents a challenge when considering a reputationalist versus a realist account of experts. On the reputationalist account rejecting experts may be viewed as little more than rejecting those whom society has collectively deemed as experts. Alternatively, adopting a realist account raises the challenge of determining who the genuine experts are. I argue that the realist account is the more compelling option for pursuing the first question. Moreover, I explore two prevalent accounts from existing literature that prescribe how epistemic agents should respond to expert testimony: the Preemptive View and the Community View. Through an examination using the simulation program Laputa, I demonstrate that both accounts are insufficient. Consequently, I argue that without a clear identification of experts in the broader context of conspiracy theories, the initial concern lacks a solid foundation, and the sense of urgency may be unwarranted.}},
author = {{Tsapos, Melina}},
issn = {{0020-174X}},
keywords = {{Experts; conspiracy theory; conspiracy theorist; Laputa simulation program; epistemic networks}},
language = {{eng}},
publisher = {{Routledge}},
series = {{Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy}},
title = {{Should We Worry About Conspiracy Theorists Rejecting Experts?}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2024.2375774}},
doi = {{10.1080/0020174X.2024.2375774}},
year = {{2024}},
}