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Academic commercialization and changing nature of academic cooperation

Shibayama, Sotaro LU (2015) In Journal of Evolutionary Economics 25(2). p.513-532
Abstract

Recent economic policies emphasize the role of academic science in technological innovation and economic growth and encourage universities and individual academics to engage in commercial activities. In this trend of academic commercialization, a growing concern has been expressed that its potential incompatibility with the traditional norms of open science could undermine the cooperative climate in academia. Drawing on the framework of evolution of the cooperation, this study examines the changing nature of academic cooperation under the current policy trend. In an ideal state of open science, academics are supposed to cooperate gratis and unconditionally. However, results predict that the commercialized regime could compromise... (More)

Recent economic policies emphasize the role of academic science in technological innovation and economic growth and encourage universities and individual academics to engage in commercial activities. In this trend of academic commercialization, a growing concern has been expressed that its potential incompatibility with the traditional norms of open science could undermine the cooperative climate in academia. Drawing on the framework of evolution of the cooperation, this study examines the changing nature of academic cooperation under the current policy trend. In an ideal state of open science, academics are supposed to cooperate gratis and unconditionally. However, results predict that the commercialized regime could compromise underlying mechanisms of cooperation and allow defectors to prevail. As the trend further grows, academics would become more demanding of direct reward in exchange for cooperation, and they would refrain from engaging in cooperation but would prefer to work independently. Some interventions (e.g., centralized rewarding) could mitigate the problem but require delicate system design.

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author
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
academic commercialization, academic entrepreneurship, evolution of cooperation, evolutionary game theory, indirect reciprocity, open science, social norms, I23, L26, O33, C73, O38
in
Journal of Evolutionary Economics
volume
25
issue
2
pages
20 pages
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • scopus:84939964279
ISSN
0936-9937
DOI
10.1007/s00191-014-0387-z
language
English
LU publication?
no
id
e97c7731-df2d-4bd9-8ec9-ba7f0af7db3a
date added to LUP
2017-04-13 17:51:48
date last changed
2017-04-20 13:38:47
@article{e97c7731-df2d-4bd9-8ec9-ba7f0af7db3a,
  abstract     = {<p>Recent economic policies emphasize the role of academic science in technological innovation and economic growth and encourage universities and individual academics to engage in commercial activities. In this trend of academic commercialization, a growing concern has been expressed that its potential incompatibility with the traditional norms of open science could undermine the cooperative climate in academia. Drawing on the framework of evolution of the cooperation, this study examines the changing nature of academic cooperation under the current policy trend. In an ideal state of open science, academics are supposed to cooperate gratis and unconditionally. However, results predict that the commercialized regime could compromise underlying mechanisms of cooperation and allow defectors to prevail. As the trend further grows, academics would become more demanding of direct reward in exchange for cooperation, and they would refrain from engaging in cooperation but would prefer to work independently. Some interventions (e.g., centralized rewarding) could mitigate the problem but require delicate system design.</p>},
  author       = {Shibayama, Sotaro},
  issn         = {0936-9937},
  keyword      = {academic commercialization,academic entrepreneurship,evolution of cooperation,evolutionary game theory,indirect reciprocity,open science,social norms,I23,L26,O33,C73,O38},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {513--532},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics},
  title        = {Academic commercialization and changing nature of academic cooperation},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00191-014-0387-z},
  volume       = {25},
  year         = {2015},
}