Coherence and probability in legal evidence
(2019) In Law, Probability and Risk 18(4). p.275-294- Abstract
- The authors investigate to what extent an evaluation of legal evidence in terms of coherence (suggested by Thagard, Amaya, Van Koppen and others) is reconcilable with a probabilistic (Bayesian) approach to legal evidence. The article is written by one author (Dahlman) with a background in the bayesian approach to legal evidence, and one author (Mackor) with a background in scenario theory. The authors find common ground but partly diverge in their conclusions. Their findings give support to the claim (reductionism) that coherence can be translated into probability without loss. Dahlman therefore concludes that the probabilistic vocabulary is superior to the coherence vocabulary, since it is more precise. Mackor is more agnostic in her... (More)
- The authors investigate to what extent an evaluation of legal evidence in terms of coherence (suggested by Thagard, Amaya, Van Koppen and others) is reconcilable with a probabilistic (Bayesian) approach to legal evidence. The article is written by one author (Dahlman) with a background in the bayesian approach to legal evidence, and one author (Mackor) with a background in scenario theory. The authors find common ground but partly diverge in their conclusions. Their findings give support to the claim (reductionism) that coherence can be translated into probability without loss. Dahlman therefore concludes that the probabilistic vocabulary is superior to the coherence vocabulary, since it is more precise. Mackor is more agnostic in her conclusions about reductionism. In Mackor's view, the findings of their joint investigation do not imply that the probabilistic approach is superior to the coherentist approach. (Less)
- Abstract (Swedish)
- The authors investigate to what extent an evaluation of legal evidence in terms of coherence (suggested by Thagard, Amaya, Van Koppen and others) is reconcilable with a probabilistic (Bayesian) approach to legal evidence. The article is written by one author (Dahlman) with a background in the bayesian approach to legal evidence, and one author (Mackor) with a background in scenario theory. The authors find common ground but partly diverge in their conclusions. Their findings give support to the claim (reductionism) that coherence can be translated into probability without loss. Dahlman therefore concludes that the probabilistic vocabulary is superior to the coherence vocabulary, since it is more precise. Mackor is more agnostic in her... (More)
- The authors investigate to what extent an evaluation of legal evidence in terms of coherence (suggested by Thagard, Amaya, Van Koppen and others) is reconcilable with a probabilistic (Bayesian) approach to legal evidence. The article is written by one author (Dahlman) with a background in the bayesian approach to legal evidence, and one author (Mackor) with a background in scenario theory. The authors find common ground but partly diverge in their conclusions. Their findings give support to the claim (reductionism) that coherence can be translated into probability without loss. Dahlman therefore concludes that the probabilistic vocabulary is superior to the coherence vocabulary, since it is more precise. Mackor is more agnostic in her conclusions about reductionism. In Mackor's view, the findings of their joint investigation do not imply that the probabilistic approach is superior to the coherentist approach. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/ed82cd8b-48f2-4fc6-a3cf-8a6c5efcd8f2
- author
- Dahlman, Christian LU and Mackor, Anne Ruth
- organization
- publishing date
- 2019
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Procedural law, Processrätt
- in
- Law, Probability and Risk
- volume
- 18
- issue
- 4
- pages
- 275 - 294
- publisher
- Oxford University Press
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85084266147
- ISSN
- 1470-8396
- DOI
- 10.1093/lpr/mgz016
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- ed82cd8b-48f2-4fc6-a3cf-8a6c5efcd8f2
- date added to LUP
- 2020-02-03 10:41:24
- date last changed
- 2022-09-12 11:44:07
@article{ed82cd8b-48f2-4fc6-a3cf-8a6c5efcd8f2,
abstract = {{The authors investigate to what extent an evaluation of legal evidence in terms of coherence (suggested by Thagard, Amaya, Van Koppen and others) is reconcilable with a probabilistic (Bayesian) approach to legal evidence. The article is written by one author (Dahlman) with a background in the bayesian approach to legal evidence, and one author (Mackor) with a background in scenario theory. The authors find common ground but partly diverge in their conclusions. Their findings give support to the claim (reductionism) that coherence can be translated into probability without loss. Dahlman therefore concludes that the probabilistic vocabulary is superior to the coherence vocabulary, since it is more precise. Mackor is more agnostic in her conclusions about reductionism. In Mackor's view, the findings of their joint investigation do not imply that the probabilistic approach is superior to the coherentist approach.}},
author = {{Dahlman, Christian and Mackor, Anne Ruth}},
issn = {{1470-8396}},
keywords = {{Procedural law; Processrätt}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{4}},
pages = {{275--294}},
publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
series = {{Law, Probability and Risk}},
title = {{Coherence and probability in legal evidence}},
url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/75903137/Coherence_and_probability_in_legal_evidence.pdf}},
doi = {{10.1093/lpr/mgz016}},
volume = {{18}},
year = {{2019}},
}