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The Konnov/Mikhailov/Bakourskii espionage crises of July–August 1947 and the Vyshinskii note on Raoul Wallenberg

Matz, Johan LU (2017) In Journal of Intelligence History
Abstract

This article addresses the causes and motives behind the Soviet decision to hand over the Vyshinskii note to the Swedish government in August 1947. In this note, signed by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Ia. Vyshinskii, it was falsely claimed that the whereabouts of the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who had been arrested by the Soviet military counterespionage death to the spies (Smersh) on 17 January 1945, were unknown to the Soviet government. Wallenberg had presumably, the note laid down, died during the battle of Budapest in January 1945. On the basis of Soviet and Swedish documents, including recently declassified Soviet encrypted cables, this article examines the chain of events that preceded the decision to hand over the... (More)

This article addresses the causes and motives behind the Soviet decision to hand over the Vyshinskii note to the Swedish government in August 1947. In this note, signed by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Ia. Vyshinskii, it was falsely claimed that the whereabouts of the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who had been arrested by the Soviet military counterespionage death to the spies (Smersh) on 17 January 1945, were unknown to the Soviet government. Wallenberg had presumably, the note laid down, died during the battle of Budapest in January 1945. On the basis of Soviet and Swedish documents, including recently declassified Soviet encrypted cables, this article examines the chain of events that preceded the decision to hand over the note. New findings among the Soviet encrypted cables suggest that the note may have had no link whatsoever to Wallenberg’s purported death on 17 July 1947. Instead a series of incidents, in particular a crisis in the relations between Sweden and the USSR following the disclosure in late July and early August 1947 of two cases of suspected Soviet military espionage in Sweden, may have been of critical importance for the decision to hand over the note.

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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
epub
subject
keywords
Raoul Wallenberg, Soviet foreign intelligence, Soviet foreign policy, Swedish foreign policy
in
Journal of Intelligence History
pages
22 pages
publisher
Taylor & Francis
external identifiers
  • scopus:85032826034
ISSN
1616-1262
DOI
10.1080/16161262.2017.1397291
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
ef8877af-6704-4cf1-81c5-109199c7a729
date added to LUP
2017-11-15 07:30:33
date last changed
2018-01-07 12:25:48
@article{ef8877af-6704-4cf1-81c5-109199c7a729,
  abstract     = {<p>This article addresses the causes and motives behind the Soviet decision to hand over the Vyshinskii note to the Swedish government in August 1947. In this note, signed by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Ia. Vyshinskii, it was falsely claimed that the whereabouts of the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who had been arrested by the Soviet military counterespionage death to the spies (Smersh) on 17 January 1945, were unknown to the Soviet government. Wallenberg had presumably, the note laid down, died during the battle of Budapest in January 1945. On the basis of Soviet and Swedish documents, including recently declassified Soviet encrypted cables, this article examines the chain of events that preceded the decision to hand over the note. New findings among the Soviet encrypted cables suggest that the note may have had no link whatsoever to Wallenberg’s purported death on 17 July 1947. Instead a series of incidents, in particular a crisis in the relations between Sweden and the USSR following the disclosure in late July and early August 1947 of two cases of suspected Soviet military espionage in Sweden, may have been of critical importance for the decision to hand over the note.</p>},
  author       = {Matz, Johan},
  issn         = {1616-1262},
  keyword      = {Raoul Wallenberg,Soviet foreign intelligence,Soviet foreign policy,Swedish foreign policy},
  language     = {eng},
  month        = {11},
  pages        = {22},
  publisher    = {Taylor & Francis},
  series       = {Journal of Intelligence History},
  title        = {The Konnov/Mikhailov/Bakourskii espionage crises of July–August 1947 and the Vyshinskii note on Raoul Wallenberg},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2017.1397291},
  year         = {2017},
}