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Crises, investments, and political institutions

Andersson, Per F. LU and Lindvall, Johannes LU orcid (2018) In Journal of Theoretical Politics 30(4). p.410-430
Abstract

On the basis of a game-theoretic model, this paper argues that governments typically manage crises more effectively in systems where political power is concentrated in a single party, but they are more likely to make investments in future welfare in systems where political power is shared among several parties. The paper makes two contributions. First of all, it shows that both crisis-management failures and investment failures can be explained by a common mechanism: an inter-temporal commitment problem that arises from the inability of political agents to commit to future policy choices. Second, it shows that power-sharing institutions are often associated with more effective government than power-concentration institutions, in... (More)

On the basis of a game-theoretic model, this paper argues that governments typically manage crises more effectively in systems where political power is concentrated in a single party, but they are more likely to make investments in future welfare in systems where political power is shared among several parties. The paper makes two contributions. First of all, it shows that both crisis-management failures and investment failures can be explained by a common mechanism: an inter-temporal commitment problem that arises from the inability of political agents to commit to future policy choices. Second, it shows that power-sharing institutions are often associated with more effective government than power-concentration institutions, in contrast to much of the normative literature in comparative politics, in which power-sharing institutions are often justified on other grounds, such as representativeness, responsiveness, or social cohesion. In a world where crises dominate, power-concentration institutions typically perform better; in a world where investment problems dominate, power-sharing institutions typically perform better.

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Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Commitment, constitutions, crises, investments
in
Journal of Theoretical Politics
volume
30
issue
4
pages
410 - 430
publisher
SAGE Publications
external identifiers
  • scopus:85052123550
ISSN
0951-6298
DOI
10.1177/0951629818791032
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
f2a0ec8b-34f5-4de0-ab74-ce7465345e4c
date added to LUP
2018-10-04 09:39:05
date last changed
2021-09-22 05:50:50
@article{f2a0ec8b-34f5-4de0-ab74-ce7465345e4c,
  abstract     = {<p>On the basis of a game-theoretic model, this paper argues that governments typically manage crises more effectively in systems where political power is concentrated in a single party, but they are more likely to make investments in future welfare in systems where political power is shared among several parties. The paper makes two contributions. First of all, it shows that both crisis-management failures and investment failures can be explained by a common mechanism: an inter-temporal commitment problem that arises from the inability of political agents to commit to future policy choices. Second, it shows that power-sharing institutions are often associated with more effective government than power-concentration institutions, in contrast to much of the normative literature in comparative politics, in which power-sharing institutions are often justified on other grounds, such as representativeness, responsiveness, or social cohesion. In a world where crises dominate, power-concentration institutions typically perform better; in a world where investment problems dominate, power-sharing institutions typically perform better.</p>},
  author       = {Andersson, Per F. and Lindvall, Johannes},
  issn         = {0951-6298},
  language     = {eng},
  month        = {08},
  number       = {4},
  pages        = {410--430},
  publisher    = {SAGE Publications},
  series       = {Journal of Theoretical Politics},
  title        = {Crises, investments, and political institutions},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629818791032},
  doi          = {10.1177/0951629818791032},
  volume       = {30},
  year         = {2018},
}