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Coalitions, Coordination and Electoral Choice : A Lab Experimental Study of Strategic Voting

FREDÉN, ANNIKA LU (2016) In Voting Experiments Part III. p.191-213
Abstract
When a voter chooses between large and small parties in a coalition, strategic reasons may be the tie-breaker. “Strategic voting” is often defined as a vote for another party than one’s most preferred one with the intention to affect the outcome of the election. The presence of coalitions can sometimes be argued to lead to less strategic voting, whereas others claim that coalitions create more strategic incentives. This chapter looks at how the relative strength of parties in a coalition affect voters’ tendency to vote strategically. Comparing two contexts with more or less uncertainty about which parties will make it to the parliament, the findings are that voters cast strategic votes for small parties to a greater extent when there are... (More)
When a voter chooses between large and small parties in a coalition, strategic reasons may be the tie-breaker. “Strategic voting” is often defined as a vote for another party than one’s most preferred one with the intention to affect the outcome of the election. The presence of coalitions can sometimes be argued to lead to less strategic voting, whereas others claim that coalitions create more strategic incentives. This chapter looks at how the relative strength of parties in a coalition affect voters’ tendency to vote strategically. Comparing two contexts with more or less uncertainty about which parties will make it to the parliament, the findings are that voters cast strategic votes for small parties to a greater extent when there are substantial size differences between the coalition parties. Individual expectations of parties’ likelihood of success are crucial to the decision making. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
publication status
published
subject
in
Voting Experiments
editor
Blais, André; Laslier, Jean-François; Van der Straeten, Karine; ; and
volume
Part III
pages
191 - 213
publisher
Springer International Publishing
external identifiers
  • scopus:85018037467
ISBN
978-3-319-40573-5
978-3-319-40571-1
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-40573-5_10
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
f6767d86-9974-4fad-9e3a-7be975b25d86
date added to LUP
2016-10-31 14:45:43
date last changed
2017-06-04 04:53:44
@inbook{f6767d86-9974-4fad-9e3a-7be975b25d86,
  abstract     = {When a voter chooses between large and small parties in a coalition, strategic reasons may be the tie-breaker. “Strategic voting” is often defined as a vote for another party than one’s most preferred one with the intention to affect the outcome of the election. The presence of coalitions can sometimes be argued to lead to less strategic voting, whereas others claim that coalitions create more strategic incentives. This chapter looks at how the relative strength of parties in a coalition affect voters’ tendency to vote strategically. Comparing two contexts with more or less uncertainty about which parties will make it to the parliament, the findings are that voters cast strategic votes for small parties to a greater extent when there are substantial size differences between the coalition parties. Individual expectations of parties’ likelihood of success are crucial to the decision making. },
  author       = {FREDÉN, ANNIKA},
  editor       = {Blais, André and Laslier, Jean-François and Van der Straeten, Karine},
  isbn         = {978-3-319-40573-5},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {191--213},
  publisher    = {Springer International Publishing},
  series       = { Voting Experiments},
  title        = {Coalitions, Coordination and Electoral Choice :  A Lab Experimental Study of Strategic Voting},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40573-5_10},
  volume       = {Part III},
  year         = {2016},
}