Pass the Buck to Reasons for What? On How to Characterise the Response Component of the Buck-Passing Analysis of Value
(2026) In Theoria (Sweden)- Abstract
According to defenders of the popular buck-passing account of value (the BPA of value), values should be understood in terms of reasons for pro- and con-responses. While much has been said about how to understand the normative component of the BPA of value, that is, how to understand ‘reasons’, including how to distinguish between reasons that imply value (the ‘right’ kind of reasons) and those that do not (the ‘wrong’ kind of reasons), less has been said about how to understand the response component, that is, how to interpret ‘pro- and con-responses’. Contrary to common usage in the debate, we argue against understanding values in terms of reasons for attitudes and reasons for action. Briefly, we contend that including reasons for... (More)
According to defenders of the popular buck-passing account of value (the BPA of value), values should be understood in terms of reasons for pro- and con-responses. While much has been said about how to understand the normative component of the BPA of value, that is, how to understand ‘reasons’, including how to distinguish between reasons that imply value (the ‘right’ kind of reasons) and those that do not (the ‘wrong’ kind of reasons), less has been said about how to understand the response component, that is, how to interpret ‘pro- and con-responses’. Contrary to common usage in the debate, we argue against understanding values in terms of reasons for attitudes and reasons for action. Briefly, we contend that including reasons for action is unnecessary, has undesirable consequences for the debate on the wrong kind of reason problem, and enables us to generate novel yet mundane cases of the wrong kind of value problem. An important upshot of the paper is that it supports an alternative, prima facie attractive picture of the hierarchy of the normative landscape, in which reasons for attitudes are explanatorily prior to value and to our value-related reasons for action.
(Less)
- author
- Johansson Werkmäster, Marta LU and Werkmäster, Jakob LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2026
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- in press
- subject
- keywords
- Buck-passing account of value, degrees of value, fitting attitude analysis of value, valence, wrong kind of reason problem, wrong kind of value problem
- in
- Theoria (Sweden)
- publisher
- John Wiley & Sons Inc.
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:105039065933
- ISSN
- 0040-5825
- DOI
- 10.1111/theo.70094
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- additional info
- Publisher Copyright: © 2026 The Author(s). Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stiftelsen Theoria.
- id
- f83a0798-bae8-4610-ad70-5875616ddb7b
- date added to LUP
- 2026-07-14 15:26:34
- date last changed
- 2026-07-14 15:27:26
@article{f83a0798-bae8-4610-ad70-5875616ddb7b,
abstract = {{<p>According to defenders of the popular buck-passing account of value (the BPA of value), values should be understood in terms of reasons for pro- and con-responses. While much has been said about how to understand the normative component of the BPA of value, that is, how to understand ‘reasons’, including how to distinguish between reasons that imply value (the ‘right’ kind of reasons) and those that do not (the ‘wrong’ kind of reasons), less has been said about how to understand the response component, that is, how to interpret ‘pro- and con-responses’. Contrary to common usage in the debate, we argue against understanding values in terms of reasons for attitudes and reasons for action. Briefly, we contend that including reasons for action is unnecessary, has undesirable consequences for the debate on the wrong kind of reason problem, and enables us to generate novel yet mundane cases of the wrong kind of value problem. An important upshot of the paper is that it supports an alternative, prima facie attractive picture of the hierarchy of the normative landscape, in which reasons for attitudes are explanatorily prior to value and to our value-related reasons for action.</p>}},
author = {{Johansson Werkmäster, Marta and Werkmäster, Jakob}},
issn = {{0040-5825}},
keywords = {{Buck-passing account of value; degrees of value; fitting attitude analysis of value; valence; wrong kind of reason problem; wrong kind of value problem}},
language = {{eng}},
publisher = {{John Wiley & Sons Inc.}},
series = {{Theoria (Sweden)}},
title = {{Pass the Buck to Reasons for What? On How to Characterise the Response Component of the Buck-Passing Analysis of Value}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/theo.70094}},
doi = {{10.1111/theo.70094}},
year = {{2026}},
}