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The Unified Conceptual Space Theory: An Enactive Theory of Concepts

Parthemore, Joel LU (2013) In Adaptive Behavior 21(3). p.168-177
Abstract
Theories of concepts address systematically and productively structured thought. Until the Unified Conceptual Space Theory (UCST), based on Peter Gärdenfors’ Conceptual Spaces Theory, no one had attempted to offer an explicitly enactive theory of concepts. UCST is set apart from its competitors in locating concepts not in the mind (or brain) of the conceptual agent nor in the affordances of the agent’s environment but in the interaction between the two. On the UCST account, concepts are never truly static: conceptual knowledge is always in the process of being "brought forth", such that neither agent nor environment can cleanly be separated from the other, and the preconceptual noumena cannot be reconstructed free of conceptual taint.... (More)
Theories of concepts address systematically and productively structured thought. Until the Unified Conceptual Space Theory (UCST), based on Peter Gärdenfors’ Conceptual Spaces Theory, no one had attempted to offer an explicitly enactive theory of concepts. UCST is set apart from its competitors in locating concepts not in the mind (or brain) of the conceptual agent nor in the affordances of the agent’s environment but in the interaction between the two. On the UCST account, concepts are never truly static: conceptual knowledge is always in the process of being "brought forth", such that neither agent nor environment can cleanly be separated from the other, and the preconceptual noumena cannot be reconstructed free of conceptual taint. Through such conceptual coloring, mind extends into the world. Concepts create binary distinctions – beginning, most importantly, with the self/non-self distinction – and discrete entities that mask what are, with respect to the conceptual framework, underlying continua. These distinctions – implying notions of e.g. internal and external, inner experience and outer world – are both conceptually necessaryand, at the same time, lacking prior ontological status. They are meaningful only with respect to

some identifiable observer (which could, in appropriate circumstances, be the organism itself). In consequence, phenomenology has a key role to play, and first-person methods are indispensable to any empirical investigation of concepts. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
extended mind, Voronoi tessellation, conceptual spaces, representation, embodiment, concepts, systematicity, productivity, autopoiesis, enactive, enaction
in
Adaptive Behavior
volume
21
issue
3
pages
168 - 177
publisher
SAGE Publications Inc.
external identifiers
  • wos:000320763400005
  • scopus:84879332832
ISSN
1741-2633
DOI
10.1177/1059712313482803
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
f8b03b57-21eb-4db5-912e-f692a48218d0 (old id 3561532)
date added to LUP
2013-03-11 12:39:09
date last changed
2017-04-30 12:33:12
@article{f8b03b57-21eb-4db5-912e-f692a48218d0,
  abstract     = {Theories of concepts address systematically and productively structured thought. Until the Unified Conceptual Space Theory (UCST), based on Peter Gärdenfors’ Conceptual Spaces Theory, no one had attempted to offer an explicitly enactive theory of concepts. UCST is set apart from its competitors in locating concepts not in the mind (or brain) of the conceptual agent nor in the affordances of the agent’s environment but in the interaction between the two. On the UCST account, concepts are never truly static: conceptual knowledge is always in the process of being "brought forth", such that neither agent nor environment can cleanly be separated from the other, and the preconceptual noumena cannot be reconstructed free of conceptual taint. Through such conceptual coloring, mind extends into the world. Concepts create binary distinctions – beginning, most importantly, with the self/non-self distinction – and discrete entities that mask what are, with respect to the conceptual framework, underlying continua. These distinctions – implying notions of e.g. internal and external, inner experience and outer world – are both conceptually necessaryand, at the same time, lacking prior ontological status. They are meaningful only with respect to<br/><br>
some identifiable observer (which could, in appropriate circumstances, be the organism itself). In consequence, phenomenology has a key role to play, and first-person methods are indispensable to any empirical investigation of concepts.},
  author       = {Parthemore, Joel},
  issn         = {1741-2633},
  keyword      = {extended mind,Voronoi tessellation,conceptual spaces,representation,embodiment,concepts,systematicity,productivity,autopoiesis,enactive,enaction},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {3},
  pages        = {168--177},
  publisher    = {SAGE Publications Inc.},
  series       = {Adaptive Behavior},
  title        = {The Unified Conceptual Space Theory: An Enactive Theory of Concepts},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1059712313482803},
  volume       = {21},
  year         = {2013},
}