An Assembled Message : Matthen on the Content of Perceptual Experience
(2023) In Synthese- Abstract
- Mohan Matthen holds that visual perceptual content is divided into descriptive and referential elements. Descriptive content is our awareness of sensory features belonging to objects located in the visual field. Matthen conceives of this in terms of an image. The referential element is a demonstrative form of content, by which we pick out those objects as particulars and assert their physical presence. Matthen terms this ‘the feeling of presence’. Together, they make up the ‘assembled message’ that visual states present to the perceiver in perceptual experience. I argue that the two elements cannot play together as Matthen envisages. Beginning with the referential element, I show that the feeling of presence is unable to both provide... (More)
- Mohan Matthen holds that visual perceptual content is divided into descriptive and referential elements. Descriptive content is our awareness of sensory features belonging to objects located in the visual field. Matthen conceives of this in terms of an image. The referential element is a demonstrative form of content, by which we pick out those objects as particulars and assert their physical presence. Matthen terms this ‘the feeling of presence’. Together, they make up the ‘assembled message’ that visual states present to the perceiver in perceptual experience. I argue that the two elements cannot play together as Matthen envisages. Beginning with the referential element, I show that the feeling of presence is unable to both provide demonstrative reference and assert that the visual state reflects how things are. Turning to the descriptive element, I argue that Matthen is committed to a view on which descriptive (or image) content is a mental entity, a reified image. This is a common element across perceptual experience, episodic memory and visual imagination. The mental entity proves a defective ingredient in assembling perceptual content that purports to present reality. There are problems integrating the depicted viewpoint with the subject’s actual viewpoint, and problems maintaining a coherent notion of assertion. I argue that the project of assembling perceptual experience from descriptive and referential elements is unworkable. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/ff1f1c98-66af-44e6-af84-c32e652e254e
- author
- Minden Ribeiro, Max LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2023
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Mohan Matthen, perceptual experience, perceptual content, feeling of presence, assertion, mental image
- in
- Synthese
- article number
- 35
- pages
- 21 pages
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85165375590
- ISSN
- 0039-7857
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11229-023-04232-0
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- ff1f1c98-66af-44e6-af84-c32e652e254e
- date added to LUP
- 2023-06-22 21:30:36
- date last changed
- 2023-07-28 04:01:35
@article{ff1f1c98-66af-44e6-af84-c32e652e254e,
abstract = {{Mohan Matthen holds that visual perceptual content is divided into descriptive and referential elements. Descriptive content is our awareness of sensory features belonging to objects located in the visual field. Matthen conceives of this in terms of an image. The referential element is a demonstrative form of content, by which we pick out those objects as particulars and assert their physical presence. Matthen terms this ‘the feeling of presence’. Together, they make up the ‘assembled message’ that visual states present to the perceiver in perceptual experience. I argue that the two elements cannot play together as Matthen envisages. Beginning with the referential element, I show that the feeling of presence is unable to both provide demonstrative reference and assert that the visual state reflects how things are. Turning to the descriptive element, I argue that Matthen is committed to a view on which descriptive (or image) content is a mental entity, a reified image. This is a common element across perceptual experience, episodic memory and visual imagination. The mental entity proves a defective ingredient in assembling perceptual content that purports to present reality. There are problems integrating the depicted viewpoint with the subject’s actual viewpoint, and problems maintaining a coherent notion of assertion. I argue that the project of assembling perceptual experience from descriptive and referential elements is unworkable.}},
author = {{Minden Ribeiro, Max}},
issn = {{0039-7857}},
keywords = {{Mohan Matthen; perceptual experience; perceptual content; feeling of presence; assertion; mental image}},
language = {{eng}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Synthese}},
title = {{An Assembled Message : Matthen on the Content of Perceptual Experience}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04232-0}},
doi = {{10.1007/s11229-023-04232-0}},
year = {{2023}},
}