Is Presence Perceptual?
(2022) In Phenomenology & Mind p.160-168- Abstract
- Perceptual experience and visual imagination both offer a first-person perspective on visible objects. But these perspectives are strikingly different. For it is distinctive of ordinary perceptual intentionality that objects seem to be present to the perceiver. I term this phenomenal property of experience ‘presence’. This paper introduces a positive definition of presence. Dokic and Martin (2017) argue that presence is not a genuine property of perceptual experience, appealing to empirical research on derealisation disorders, Parkinson’s disease, virtual reality and hallucination. I demonstrate that their arguments fall short of establishing that presence is not perceptual.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/ff8038d3-bc1a-48fc-82b0-d5028cba5ba6
- author
- Minden Ribeiro, Max LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2022
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Perceptual presence, Perceptual experience, Phenomenology, Intentionality
- in
- Phenomenology & Mind
- issue
- 22
- pages
- 8 pages
- publisher
- Firenze University Press
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85138116543
- ISSN
- 2280-7853
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- ff8038d3-bc1a-48fc-82b0-d5028cba5ba6
- alternative location
- https://journals.openedition.org/phenomenology/1020
- date added to LUP
- 2022-09-13 00:07:54
- date last changed
- 2022-11-21 18:08:07
@article{ff8038d3-bc1a-48fc-82b0-d5028cba5ba6,
abstract = {{Perceptual experience and visual imagination both offer a first-person perspective on visible objects. But these perspectives are strikingly different. For it is distinctive of ordinary perceptual intentionality that objects seem to be present to the perceiver. I term this phenomenal property of experience ‘presence’. This paper introduces a positive definition of presence. Dokic and Martin (2017) argue that presence is not a genuine property of perceptual experience, appealing to empirical research on derealisation disorders, Parkinson’s disease, virtual reality and hallucination. I demonstrate that their arguments fall short of establishing that presence is not perceptual.}},
author = {{Minden Ribeiro, Max}},
issn = {{2280-7853}},
keywords = {{Perceptual presence; Perceptual experience; Phenomenology; Intentionality}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{22}},
pages = {{160--168}},
publisher = {{Firenze University Press}},
series = {{Phenomenology & Mind}},
title = {{Is Presence Perceptual?}},
url = {{https://journals.openedition.org/phenomenology/1020}},
year = {{2022}},
}