Skip to main content

LUP Student Papers

LUND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

United in willingness? The enhanced cooperation turn of the EU's Ukraine funding crisis

Bissinger, Christian Maurice LU (2026) STVM23 20261
Department of Political Science
Abstract
In December 2025, the European Council approved a €90 bn loan to cover Ukraine’s financing needs for 2026–2027, backed by the EU budget headroom. This marked a pragmatic turn after the initial proposal to leverage €210 bn in immobilised assets from the Central Bank of Russia for a Reparations Loan encountered insurmountable resistance. Belgium, as host to most of the assets, demanded unlimited guarantees to shield itself from litigation and retaliation risks, while, most prominently, Hungary refused to support several proposals that require unanimous decision-making. The final agreement is anchored in the EU treaties, such as enhanced cooperation, the EU’s ‘Crisis Article’ and tested Macro Financial Assistance schemes. This allowed the 24... (More)
In December 2025, the European Council approved a €90 bn loan to cover Ukraine’s financing needs for 2026–2027, backed by the EU budget headroom. This marked a pragmatic turn after the initial proposal to leverage €210 bn in immobilised assets from the Central Bank of Russia for a Reparations Loan encountered insurmountable resistance. Belgium, as host to most of the assets, demanded unlimited guarantees to shield itself from litigation and retaliation risks, while, most prominently, Hungary refused to support several proposals that require unanimous decision-making. The final agreement is anchored in the EU treaties, such as enhanced cooperation, the EU’s ‘Crisis Article’ and tested Macro Financial Assistance schemes. This allowed the 24 Member States that consented to proceed without the dissenting ones, whilst keeping the assets immobilised.

Adopting a mechanistic approach, this analysis, based on elite interviews and publicly available sources, traces how preference divergence, politico-technical bargaining, and legal-institutional constraints shaped this outcome. The study examines the mismatch between the expectation to leverage the assets and the political reality of divergent national interests and institutional hurdles. It finds that, while the EU lowered expectations, it demonstrated new assertiveness in its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), using tools it had long avoided to bypass the unanimity gridlock. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Bissinger, Christian Maurice LU
supervisor
organization
course
STVM23 20261
year
type
H2 - Master's Degree (Two Years)
subject
keywords
CFSP, EU Economic Statecraft, EU Inter-institutional cooperation, Enhanced Cooperation, Ukraine
language
English
id
9226613
date added to LUP
2026-06-16 14:52:07
date last changed
2026-08-04 12:08:51
@misc{9226613,
  abstract     = {{In December 2025, the European Council approved a €90 bn loan to cover Ukraine’s financing needs for 2026–2027, backed by the EU budget headroom. This marked a pragmatic turn after the initial proposal to leverage €210 bn in immobilised assets from the Central Bank of Russia for a Reparations Loan encountered insurmountable resistance. Belgium, as host to most of the assets, demanded unlimited guarantees to shield itself from litigation and retaliation risks, while, most prominently, Hungary refused to support several proposals that require unanimous decision-making. The final agreement is anchored in the EU treaties, such as enhanced cooperation, the EU’s ‘Crisis Article’ and tested Macro Financial Assistance schemes. This allowed the 24 Member States that consented to proceed without the dissenting ones, whilst keeping the assets immobilised.

Adopting a mechanistic approach, this analysis, based on elite interviews and publicly available sources, traces how preference divergence, politico-technical bargaining, and legal-institutional constraints shaped this outcome. The study examines the mismatch between the expectation to leverage the assets and the political reality of divergent national interests and institutional hurdles. It finds that, while the EU lowered expectations, it demonstrated new assertiveness in its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), using tools it had long avoided to bypass the unanimity gridlock.}},
  author       = {{Bissinger, Christian Maurice}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{United in willingness? The enhanced cooperation turn of the EU's Ukraine funding crisis}},
  year         = {{2026}},
}