Who Governs the Common Fisheries Policy? - A Constitutional Analysis of the CJEU’s Ruling in Friends of the Irish Environment (C-330/22)
(2026) JURM02 20261Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract
- Who decides how many fish may be caught in European waters, and on what legal basis? These questions lie at the heart of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), the framework through which the European Union exercises its exclusive competence over the exploitation and conservation of marine biological resources. Its governance is structured around two distinct legal bases in Arti-cle 43 TFEU: Article 43(2), under which the European Parliament and the Council jointly adopt the provisions necessary for the pursuit of the CFP's objectives, and Article 43(3), under which the Council alone fixes and allo-cates fishing opportunities among the Member States.
This thesis examines the configuration of institutional balance within the CFP and whether... (More) - Who decides how many fish may be caught in European waters, and on what legal basis? These questions lie at the heart of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), the framework through which the European Union exercises its exclusive competence over the exploitation and conservation of marine biological resources. Its governance is structured around two distinct legal bases in Arti-cle 43 TFEU: Article 43(2), under which the European Parliament and the Council jointly adopt the provisions necessary for the pursuit of the CFP's objectives, and Article 43(3), under which the Council alone fixes and allo-cates fishing opportunities among the Member States.
This thesis examines the configuration of institutional balance within the CFP and whether it ensures sufficient interest representation in accordance with the democratic ideal enshrined in Article 10(3) TEU. In doing so, it adopts the understanding of institutional balance as a political principle developed by Lenaerts and Verhoeven, while remaining grounded in a legal dogmatic meth-od informed by the European legal method as described by Neergaard and Nielsen.
The thesis demonstrates that the institutional balance within the CFP cannot be adequately understood through the Treaty framework alone. The practical scope of the Council's competence under Article 43(3) TFEU is shaped not only by the Treaties but also by the legislative framework adopted under Article 43(2) TFEU, informal interinstitutional agreements, and judicial interpretation.
This is illustrated through an analysis of the MSY objective introduced in Article 2(2) of the CFP Basic Regulation and its subsequent implementation through the multiannual plans, where a key interinstitutional agreement concluded outside the ordinary legislative procedure proved instrumental in defining how the objective applies in practice. The CJEU's judgment in Friends of the Irish Environment (C-330/22) and the General Court's subse-quent ruling in ClientEarth v Council (Joined Cases T-577/22 and T-648/22) confirm and develop this dynamic. Both courts read Article 2(2) in light of the legislative framework as a whole, finding that the Council retains a broad margin of discretion when allocating fishing opportunities for by-catch stocks in mixed fisheries under Article 43(3) TFEU. While this approach preserves the Council's meaningful prerogative under the Treaties, it also raises concerns regarding democratic legitimacy, as the practical meaning of a key legislative choice has been shaped through informal processes at considerable distance from the channels of accountability that Article 10 TEU relies upon.
The thesis concludes that the institutional balance within the CFP falls short of the democratic ideal enshrined in Article 10(3) TEU at both levels of its institutional framework, and that the principle of participatory democracy under Article 11 TEU may offer a meaningful complement to the deficiencies of the representative democratic channels currently in place. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9227402
- author
- Hasselgren, Erik LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- JURM02 20261
- year
- 2026
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- EU law, Institutional balance, Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), democracy, Article 43 TFEU, Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), Mixed fisheries
- language
- English
- id
- 9227402
- date added to LUP
- 2026-06-12 10:46:16
- date last changed
- 2026-06-12 10:46:16
@misc{9227402,
abstract = {{Who decides how many fish may be caught in European waters, and on what legal basis? These questions lie at the heart of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), the framework through which the European Union exercises its exclusive competence over the exploitation and conservation of marine biological resources. Its governance is structured around two distinct legal bases in Arti-cle 43 TFEU: Article 43(2), under which the European Parliament and the Council jointly adopt the provisions necessary for the pursuit of the CFP's objectives, and Article 43(3), under which the Council alone fixes and allo-cates fishing opportunities among the Member States.
This thesis examines the configuration of institutional balance within the CFP and whether it ensures sufficient interest representation in accordance with the democratic ideal enshrined in Article 10(3) TEU. In doing so, it adopts the understanding of institutional balance as a political principle developed by Lenaerts and Verhoeven, while remaining grounded in a legal dogmatic meth-od informed by the European legal method as described by Neergaard and Nielsen.
The thesis demonstrates that the institutional balance within the CFP cannot be adequately understood through the Treaty framework alone. The practical scope of the Council's competence under Article 43(3) TFEU is shaped not only by the Treaties but also by the legislative framework adopted under Article 43(2) TFEU, informal interinstitutional agreements, and judicial interpretation.
This is illustrated through an analysis of the MSY objective introduced in Article 2(2) of the CFP Basic Regulation and its subsequent implementation through the multiannual plans, where a key interinstitutional agreement concluded outside the ordinary legislative procedure proved instrumental in defining how the objective applies in practice. The CJEU's judgment in Friends of the Irish Environment (C-330/22) and the General Court's subse-quent ruling in ClientEarth v Council (Joined Cases T-577/22 and T-648/22) confirm and develop this dynamic. Both courts read Article 2(2) in light of the legislative framework as a whole, finding that the Council retains a broad margin of discretion when allocating fishing opportunities for by-catch stocks in mixed fisheries under Article 43(3) TFEU. While this approach preserves the Council's meaningful prerogative under the Treaties, it also raises concerns regarding democratic legitimacy, as the practical meaning of a key legislative choice has been shaped through informal processes at considerable distance from the channels of accountability that Article 10 TEU relies upon.
The thesis concludes that the institutional balance within the CFP falls short of the democratic ideal enshrined in Article 10(3) TEU at both levels of its institutional framework, and that the principle of participatory democracy under Article 11 TEU may offer a meaningful complement to the deficiencies of the representative democratic channels currently in place.}},
author = {{Hasselgren, Erik}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Who Governs the Common Fisheries Policy? - A Constitutional Analysis of the CJEU’s Ruling in Friends of the Irish Environment (C-330/22)}},
year = {{2026}},
}