Governing Critical Subsea Infrastructure in the Baltic Sea: Complementing UNCLOS Through the EU Resilience Framework
(2026) JURM02 20261Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract
- This thesis examines the extent to which the European Union’s resilience framework, particularly the Critical Entities Resilience Directive (CER) and the Directive on Measures for a High Common Level of Cybersecurity across the Union (NIS2), complements the legal framework established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regarding the governance and protection of critical subsea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea. The thesis focuses specifically on submarine cables and pipelines and addresses the structural limitations of existing legal frame-works in relation to contemporary threats.
The thesis applies a legal dogmatic method and analyses relevant sources of public international law and EU law through... (More) - This thesis examines the extent to which the European Union’s resilience framework, particularly the Critical Entities Resilience Directive (CER) and the Directive on Measures for a High Common Level of Cybersecurity across the Union (NIS2), complements the legal framework established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regarding the governance and protection of critical subsea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea. The thesis focuses specifically on submarine cables and pipelines and addresses the structural limitations of existing legal frame-works in relation to contemporary threats.
The thesis applies a legal dogmatic method and analyses relevant sources of public international law and EU law through treaty interpretation and EU legal methodology. UNCLOS is interpreted in accordance with the Vi-enna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), while the analysis of EU law proceeds in light of the teleological and systematic interpretative methods commonly applied within EU law.
The thesis demonstrates that UNCLOS establishes the foundational legal framework governing submarine cables and pipelines through its allocation of rights and jurisdiction between States in different maritime zones. While coastal States possess comparatively broad enforcement powers within the territorial sea, the Convention relies more heavily on flag State jurisdiction, due regard obligations and inter-State cooperation beyond territorial wa-ters. The thesis argues that this structure creates practical and legal chal-lenges regarding the protection of subsea infrastructure against contempo-rary threats in the Baltic Sea, particularly where incidents involve foreign-flagged vessels, multiple jurisdictions or suspected hybrid threats.
In contrast to UNCLOS, the CER and NIS2 Directives establish a broader resilience-oriented framework focused more directly on the protection, continuity and risk management of critical infrastructure and essential ser-vices. Through obligations relating to risk assessments, cybersecurity, su-pervision and cross-border cooperation, the Directives seek to reduce vul-nerabilities and strengthen the management of disruptions affecting subsea infrastructure.
The thesis argues that the EU resilience framework complements the UN-CLOS regime by addressing several challenges that UNCLOS was not orig-inally designed to manage. At the same time, the thesis emphasises that the EU framework continues to operate within the broader jurisdictional struc-ture established under UNCLOS and therefore cannot fully eliminate the Convention’s structural limitations. Nevertheless, the relationship between UNCLOS and the EU resilience framework is particularly significant in the Baltic Sea context due to the high degree of regional integration between the surrounding coastal States and the transnational nature of subsea infra-structure in the region. (Less) - Abstract (Swedish)
- Denna uppsats undersöker i vilken utsträckning EU:s resiliensramverk, särskilt CER-direktivet (Critical Entities Resilience Directive) och NIS2-
direktivet (Directive on Measures for a High Common Level of Cybersecurity across the Union), kompletterar det rättsliga ramverk som etableras genom Förenta nationernas havsrättskonvention (UNCLOS) avseende styrningen och skyddet av kritisk undervattensinfrastruktur i Östersjön. Uppsatsen fokuserar särskilt på undervattenskablar och rörledningar samt de strukturella utmaningar som samtida hot medför för befintliga rättsliga ramverk.
Uppsatsen tillämpar en rättsdogmatisk metod och analyserar relevanta rättskällor inom folkrätt och EU-rätt genom traktattolkning och EU-rättslig metod. UNCLOS... (More) - Denna uppsats undersöker i vilken utsträckning EU:s resiliensramverk, särskilt CER-direktivet (Critical Entities Resilience Directive) och NIS2-
direktivet (Directive on Measures for a High Common Level of Cybersecurity across the Union), kompletterar det rättsliga ramverk som etableras genom Förenta nationernas havsrättskonvention (UNCLOS) avseende styrningen och skyddet av kritisk undervattensinfrastruktur i Östersjön. Uppsatsen fokuserar särskilt på undervattenskablar och rörledningar samt de strukturella utmaningar som samtida hot medför för befintliga rättsliga ramverk.
Uppsatsen tillämpar en rättsdogmatisk metod och analyserar relevanta rättskällor inom folkrätt och EU-rätt genom traktattolkning och EU-rättslig metod. UNCLOS tolkas i enlighet med Wienkonventionen om traktaträtten
(VCLT), medan analysen av EU-rätten genomförs mot bakgrund av de teleologiska och systematiska tolkningsmetoder som vanligtvis tillämpas inom
EU-rätten.
Uppsatsen visar att UNCLOS etablerar det grundläggande rättsliga ramverket för undervattenskablar och rörledningar genom sin reglering av rättigheter och jurisdiktion mellan stater i olika maritima zoner. Medan kuststater
har relativt långtgående tillsyns- och verkställighetsbefogenheter inom
territorialhavet, bygger konventionen i högre grad på flaggstatsjurisdiktion,
due regard-skyldigheter och mellanstatligt samarbete utanför territorialhavet. Uppsatsen argumenterar för att denna struktur skapar praktiska och
rättsliga utmaningar i relation till skyddet av undervattensinfrastruktur mot
samtida hot i Östersjön, särskilt när incidenter involverar utlandsflaggade
fartyg, flera jurisdiktioner eller misstänkta hybridhot.
Till skillnad från UNCLOS etablerar CER- och NIS2-direktiven ett bredare
resiliensinriktat ramverk som mer direkt fokuserar på skydd, kontinuitet och
riskhantering av kritisk infrastruktur och samhällsviktiga tjänster. Genom
skyldigheter avseende riskbedömningar, cybersäkerhet, tillsyn och gränsöverskridande samarbete syftar direktiven till att minska sårbarheter och
stärka hanteringen av störningar som påverkar undervattensinfrastruktur.
Uppsatsen argumenterar för att EU:s resiliensramverk kompletterar UNCLOS-regimen genom att adressera flera styrnings- och samordningsrelaterade utmaningar som UNCLOS ursprungligen inte utformades för att hantera. Samtidigt betonas att EU:s ramverk fortsatt verkar inom den bredare
jurisdiktionsstruktur som etableras genom UNCLOS och därför inte fullt ut
kan eliminera konventionens strukturella begränsningar. Relationen mellan
UNCLOS och EU:s resiliensramverk är emellertid särskilt betydelsefull i
Östersjökontexten på grund av den höga graden av regional integration mellan de omkringliggande kuststaterna och undervattensinfrastrukturens gränsöverskridande karaktär i regionen. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9227513
- author
- Jellhede, Isabelle LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- JURM02 20261
- year
- 2026
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- EU law, public international law, maritime law
- language
- English
- id
- 9227513
- date added to LUP
- 2026-06-12 10:45:58
- date last changed
- 2026-06-12 10:45:58
@misc{9227513,
abstract = {{This thesis examines the extent to which the European Union’s resilience framework, particularly the Critical Entities Resilience Directive (CER) and the Directive on Measures for a High Common Level of Cybersecurity across the Union (NIS2), complements the legal framework established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regarding the governance and protection of critical subsea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea. The thesis focuses specifically on submarine cables and pipelines and addresses the structural limitations of existing legal frame-works in relation to contemporary threats.
The thesis applies a legal dogmatic method and analyses relevant sources of public international law and EU law through treaty interpretation and EU legal methodology. UNCLOS is interpreted in accordance with the Vi-enna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), while the analysis of EU law proceeds in light of the teleological and systematic interpretative methods commonly applied within EU law.
The thesis demonstrates that UNCLOS establishes the foundational legal framework governing submarine cables and pipelines through its allocation of rights and jurisdiction between States in different maritime zones. While coastal States possess comparatively broad enforcement powers within the territorial sea, the Convention relies more heavily on flag State jurisdiction, due regard obligations and inter-State cooperation beyond territorial wa-ters. The thesis argues that this structure creates practical and legal chal-lenges regarding the protection of subsea infrastructure against contempo-rary threats in the Baltic Sea, particularly where incidents involve foreign-flagged vessels, multiple jurisdictions or suspected hybrid threats.
In contrast to UNCLOS, the CER and NIS2 Directives establish a broader resilience-oriented framework focused more directly on the protection, continuity and risk management of critical infrastructure and essential ser-vices. Through obligations relating to risk assessments, cybersecurity, su-pervision and cross-border cooperation, the Directives seek to reduce vul-nerabilities and strengthen the management of disruptions affecting subsea infrastructure.
The thesis argues that the EU resilience framework complements the UN-CLOS regime by addressing several challenges that UNCLOS was not orig-inally designed to manage. At the same time, the thesis emphasises that the EU framework continues to operate within the broader jurisdictional struc-ture established under UNCLOS and therefore cannot fully eliminate the Convention’s structural limitations. Nevertheless, the relationship between UNCLOS and the EU resilience framework is particularly significant in the Baltic Sea context due to the high degree of regional integration between the surrounding coastal States and the transnational nature of subsea infra-structure in the region.}},
author = {{Jellhede, Isabelle}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Governing Critical Subsea Infrastructure in the Baltic Sea: Complementing UNCLOS Through the EU Resilience Framework}},
year = {{2026}},
}