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If One Thinks About Raping Someone in the Woods and No One Knows, is it Wrong? An Argument for the Moral Relevance of Thoughts*

Wikman, Neo LU (2026) FPRK01 20261
Practical Philosophy
Abstract
There are arguments around the nature and boundaries of the moral domain, with this current paper aiming to delineate one of these arguments. With a basis in George Sher's (2021) discussion of cognitions (beliefs, fantasies, attitudes and some thoughts), the paper defends the notion that they are, in fact, morally relevant. By combining the logic of truth-aptness with the phenomenology of agency, the paper demonstrates that private mental states can be regarded as genuine acts. These acts are shown to be morally relevant due to them being (i) directed, (ii) allowing for psychological agency, and (iii) endorsing a moral object. From this, cognitions can constitute and produce genuine, unfelt harms towards the subject and frustrate desires.... (More)
There are arguments around the nature and boundaries of the moral domain, with this current paper aiming to delineate one of these arguments. With a basis in George Sher's (2021) discussion of cognitions (beliefs, fantasies, attitudes and some thoughts), the paper defends the notion that they are, in fact, morally relevant. By combining the logic of truth-aptness with the phenomenology of agency, the paper demonstrates that private mental states can be regarded as genuine acts. These acts are shown to be morally relevant due to them being (i) directed, (ii) allowing for psychological agency, and (iii) endorsing a moral object. From this, cognitions can constitute and produce genuine, unfelt harms towards the subject and frustrate desires. It would indicate that the privacy of the mind provides no exemption from moral accountability; to think is to act, and to act is to be subject to the moral domain. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Wikman, Neo LU
supervisor
organization
course
FPRK01 20261
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
Doxastic wronging, unfelt harm, doxastic voluntarism, cognitions, fantasy
language
English
id
9228774
date added to LUP
2026-05-29 12:41:06
date last changed
2026-05-29 12:41:06
@misc{9228774,
  abstract     = {{There are arguments around the nature and boundaries of the moral domain, with this current paper aiming to delineate one of these arguments. With a basis in George Sher's (2021) discussion of cognitions (beliefs, fantasies, attitudes and some thoughts), the paper defends the notion that they are, in fact, morally relevant. By combining the logic of truth-aptness with the phenomenology of agency, the paper demonstrates that private mental states can be regarded as genuine acts. These acts are shown to be morally relevant due to them being (i) directed, (ii) allowing for psychological agency, and (iii) endorsing a moral object. From this, cognitions can constitute and produce genuine, unfelt harms towards the subject and frustrate desires. It would indicate that the privacy of the mind provides no exemption from moral accountability; to think is to act, and to act is to be subject to the moral domain.}},
  author       = {{Wikman, Neo}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{If One Thinks About Raping Someone in the Woods and No One Knows, is it Wrong? An Argument for the Moral Relevance of Thoughts*}},
  year         = {{2026}},
}