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Medvetenhet - det juridiska ansvarets yttersta gräns

Bennet, Tova LU (2011) JURM01 20111
Department of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
I svensk rätt utgörs den yttersta gränsen för ansvar av ett krav på tillräcklig medvetenhet. I denna uppsats utforskas den historiska och teoretiska bakgrunden till begreppet. Här presenteras det medvetenhetsbegrepp som framträder i doktrin och rättspraxis. Här förs också en diskussion om hur väl medvetenhetsbegreppet överensstämmer med de allmänna rättsliga principer som kräver förutsägbarhet, likhet inför lagen och skuld som förutsättning för straffrättsligt ansvar.

Sedan Brottsbalkens ikraftträdande 1965 bedöms alla människor ha juridisk ansvarsförmåga. För att dömas för brott krävs dock att man uppfyller kravet på uppsåt. Uppsåtskravet förutsätter i sin tur en viss kognitiv förmåga hos gärningspersonen.

I doktrinen uttrycks den... (More)
I svensk rätt utgörs den yttersta gränsen för ansvar av ett krav på tillräcklig medvetenhet. I denna uppsats utforskas den historiska och teoretiska bakgrunden till begreppet. Här presenteras det medvetenhetsbegrepp som framträder i doktrin och rättspraxis. Här förs också en diskussion om hur väl medvetenhetsbegreppet överensstämmer med de allmänna rättsliga principer som kräver förutsägbarhet, likhet inför lagen och skuld som förutsättning för straffrättsligt ansvar.

Sedan Brottsbalkens ikraftträdande 1965 bedöms alla människor ha juridisk ansvarsförmåga. För att dömas för brott krävs dock att man uppfyller kravet på uppsåt. Uppsåtskravet förutsätter i sin tur en viss kognitiv förmåga hos gärningspersonen.

I doktrinen uttrycks den kognitiva förmågan så att gärningspersonen ska ha haft insikt eller tillräcklig kännedom. Uppsåtskravet innehåller också ett voluntativt element, gärningspersonen ska ha en viss inställning till handlingen. I äldre doktrin talar man om en viljeakt.

För att skildra det medvetenhetsbegrepp som framträder i rättspraxis innehåller uppsatsen en studie av 19 rättsfall från Högsta domstolen och hovrätterna. Bilden av medvetenhet som framträder är splittrad, särskilt när det gäller tillstånd av tillfällig sinnesförvirring. Medvetenhet handlar här snarare om att gärningspersonen inte är medvetslös och kravet förefaller ställas lägre än i doktrinen. En komplicerad psykisk störning i kombination med ett allvarligt brott verkar i hög grad leda till att kravet på medvetenhet anses uppfyllt av domstolen. Det är dock mycket svårt att utläsa vilka faktorer som ligger till grund för bedömningen. I några fall blir läkarutlåtanden avgörande, i andra fall spelar handlandets yttre kännetecken en avgörande roll i bedömningen.

I och med Brottsbalkens införande tog man tydligt ställning för en ordning som gav begreppen ansvar och skuld minskad betydelse i det straffrättsliga sammanhanget. De psykiskt störda skulle inte längre särbehandlas i ansvarsledet utan i påföljdsledet.

I stället för en enhetlig teoretisk bakgrund framträder en tydlig intressekonflikt mellan de ideologiska ställningstaganden som låg till grund för Brottsbalken, och ett medvetenhetsbegrepp som tillämpas enhetligt, präglat av skuld- och konformitetsprincipen. En intressekonflikt som borde hanteras på lagstiftningsnivå men som idag utkämpas i de enskilda fallen i domstolarna, i och med just medvetenhetsbedömningen. En konflikt som drabbar rättssäkerheten för dem som är föremål för bedömningen.

Resultatet närmar sig ett medvetenhetsbegrepp som ligger långt ifrån traditionella föreställningar om skuld och ansvar och som anpassas efter det ställningstagande om effektivt juridiskt ansvar som domstolen finner lämpligt i det enskilda fallet. (Less)
Abstract
In Swedish law, legal liability is limited by a requirement of sufficient awareness (medvetenhet). The subject of this essay is to explore the theoretical and historical background of this legal concept. This is done by a presentation of how the legal term awareness is described in legal literature and case law. The essay also includes a discussion on to what extent the concept of awareness complies with the rule of law.
Since 1965, when the Swedish Criminal Code came into force, no one is exempt legal liability. Everyone, regardless of mental status, can be convicted in court. To be convicted the requirement of intent must be fulfilled. And the requirement of intent implies that the perpetrator possesses a certain cognitive ability.
In... (More)
In Swedish law, legal liability is limited by a requirement of sufficient awareness (medvetenhet). The subject of this essay is to explore the theoretical and historical background of this legal concept. This is done by a presentation of how the legal term awareness is described in legal literature and case law. The essay also includes a discussion on to what extent the concept of awareness complies with the rule of law.
Since 1965, when the Swedish Criminal Code came into force, no one is exempt legal liability. Everyone, regardless of mental status, can be convicted in court. To be convicted the requirement of intent must be fulfilled. And the requirement of intent implies that the perpetrator possesses a certain cognitive ability.
In legal literature, this cognitive ability is described as a demand for sufficient insight (insikt) or knowledge (kännedom). The requirement of intent also implies a volitional attitude towards the criminal act.
To depict the notion of awareness in case law, the essay contains a study of 19 cases from the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal. The picture emerging is diverse, particularly regarding states of temporary insanity. Here, the concept of awareness appears to signify a state of consciousness rather than awareness and the requirement seems to be lower compared to literature.
The requirement of awareness is to a high extent considered to be fulfilled in cases that involve a complex mental disorder combined with a serious crime. It is, however, very difficult to determine which factors underlie the assessments. In some cases, medical reports are crucial, in others, the external features of the act are considered to be decisive.
The introduction of the Criminal Code in 1965 represented a clear statement for a regime that considered the concepts of accountability and guilt to be less important in the context of penal law. Mentally disordered were no longer considered to be unaccountable, but were instead to be sentenced to care.
Instead of a coherent theoretical background, a clear conflict of interest emerges between the ideological positions that formed the basis of the Criminal Code, and a concept of awareness that is uniformly applied in accordance with the rule of law. This conflict of interest should be fought on a legislative level, but is in fact fought in court, in each individual case, associated with the concept of awareness. This affects the legal security of those who are subject to the assessment.
The result is a concept of awareness that is distant from traditional conceptions of guilt and liability, and that is adapted to the perception of an effective concept of legal liability concept that the court considers to be appropriate in each case. (Less)
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author
Bennet, Tova LU
supervisor
organization
course
JURM01 20111
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
Medvetenhet, uppsåt, tillfällig sinnesförvirring, psykisk störning, straffrätt, tillräknelighet
language
Swedish
id
1979715
date added to LUP
2011-06-27 14:09:57
date last changed
2011-06-27 14:09:57
@misc{1979715,
  abstract     = {In Swedish law, legal liability is limited by a requirement of sufficient awareness (medvetenhet). The subject of this essay is to explore the theoretical and historical background of this legal concept. This is done by a presentation of how the legal term awareness is described in legal literature and case law. The essay also includes a discussion on to what extent the concept of awareness complies with the rule of law.
Since 1965, when the Swedish Criminal Code came into force, no one is exempt legal liability. Everyone, regardless of mental status, can be convicted in court. To be convicted the requirement of intent must be fulfilled. And the requirement of intent implies that the perpetrator possesses a certain cognitive ability.
In legal literature, this cognitive ability is described as a demand for sufficient insight (insikt) or knowledge (kännedom). The requirement of intent also implies a volitional attitude towards the criminal act.
To depict the notion of awareness in case law, the essay contains a study of 19 cases from the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal. The picture emerging is diverse, particularly regarding states of temporary insanity. Here, the concept of awareness appears to signify a state of consciousness rather than awareness and the requirement seems to be lower compared to literature.
The requirement of awareness is to a high extent considered to be fulfilled in cases that involve a complex mental disorder combined with a serious crime. It is, however, very difficult to determine which factors underlie the assessments. In some cases, medical reports are crucial, in others, the external features of the act are considered to be decisive.
The introduction of the Criminal Code in 1965 represented a clear statement for a regime that considered the concepts of accountability and guilt to be less important in the context of penal law. Mentally disordered were no longer considered to be unaccountable, but were instead to be sentenced to care.
Instead of a coherent theoretical background, a clear conflict of interest emerges between the ideological positions that formed the basis of the Criminal Code, and a concept of awareness that is uniformly applied in accordance with the rule of law. This conflict of interest should be fought on a legislative level, but is in fact fought in court, in each individual case, associated with the concept of awareness. This affects the legal security of those who are subject to the assessment.
The result is a concept of awareness that is distant from traditional conceptions of guilt and liability, and that is adapted to the perception of an effective concept of legal liability concept that the court considers to be appropriate in each case.},
  author       = {Bennet, Tova},
  keyword      = {Medvetenhet,uppsåt,tillfällig sinnesförvirring,psykisk störning,straffrätt,tillräknelighet},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Medvetenhet - det juridiska ansvarets yttersta gräns},
  year         = {2011},
}