Skip to main content

LUP Student Papers

LUND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

Contract enforcement in Russia and Ukraine

Oscarsson, Hannes LU (2021) STVK02 20212
Department of Political Science
Abstract
The purpose of this text is to, through a case study of Russia and Ukraine, analyze the relationship between effectivity of contract enforcement and regime type. The hypothesize is that authoritarian regimes in which incumbents’ power is more safely secured will have a more robust and independent judiciary than hybrid regimes, which will have a positive effect on contract enforcement. The analysis is done through a mixture of quantitative method where Ease of doing business’ Enforcing contracts measurement is paired with Varieties of democracies’ Liberal Democracy Index, and qualitative method where theories from Maria Popova, Ketevan Bolkvadze, Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa are utilized. The primary theory applied is Popova’s Strategic... (More)
The purpose of this text is to, through a case study of Russia and Ukraine, analyze the relationship between effectivity of contract enforcement and regime type. The hypothesize is that authoritarian regimes in which incumbents’ power is more safely secured will have a more robust and independent judiciary than hybrid regimes, which will have a positive effect on contract enforcement. The analysis is done through a mixture of quantitative method where Ease of doing business’ Enforcing contracts measurement is paired with Varieties of democracies’ Liberal Democracy Index, and qualitative method where theories from Maria Popova, Ketevan Bolkvadze, Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa are utilized. The primary theory applied is Popova’s Strategic pressure theory.

The text’s conclusion is that an overarching trend of higher levels of contract enforcement within authoritarian regimes compared to hybrid regimes can be observed. However, the quantitative analyses of the individual cases showed a positive correlation in which higher levels of democracy improves contract enforcement, even within the authoritarian regime - which opposes the stated hypothesize. Nevertheless, Russia has substantially more effective contract enforcement while also being very similar to Ukraine except for regime type. The qualitative analysis shows how there are differences in contract enforcement procedure within each respective judiciary and how Strategic pressure theory can help explain those. Still, this text lacks the substantial evidence to establish a clear causal link and therefore concludes by recommending future research. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Oscarsson, Hannes LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
A case study of the difference in contract enforcement between hybrid and authoritarian regimes
course
STVK02 20212
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
Contract enforcement, Strategic pressure theory, Democratization, Judiciary Independence, Hybrid regime, Authoritarian Regime, Ukraine, Russia
language
English
id
9070496
date added to LUP
2022-03-14 12:22:06
date last changed
2022-03-14 12:22:06
@misc{9070496,
  abstract     = {{The purpose of this text is to, through a case study of Russia and Ukraine, analyze the relationship between effectivity of contract enforcement and regime type. The hypothesize is that authoritarian regimes in which incumbents’ power is more safely secured will have a more robust and independent judiciary than hybrid regimes, which will have a positive effect on contract enforcement. The analysis is done through a mixture of quantitative method where Ease of doing business’ Enforcing contracts measurement is paired with Varieties of democracies’ Liberal Democracy Index, and qualitative method where theories from Maria Popova, Ketevan Bolkvadze, Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa are utilized. The primary theory applied is Popova’s Strategic pressure theory.

The text’s conclusion is that an overarching trend of higher levels of contract enforcement within authoritarian regimes compared to hybrid regimes can be observed. However, the quantitative analyses of the individual cases showed a positive correlation in which higher levels of democracy improves contract enforcement, even within the authoritarian regime - which opposes the stated hypothesize. Nevertheless, Russia has substantially more effective contract enforcement while also being very similar to Ukraine except for regime type. The qualitative analysis shows how there are differences in contract enforcement procedure within each respective judiciary and how Strategic pressure theory can help explain those. Still, this text lacks the substantial evidence to establish a clear causal link and therefore concludes by recommending future research.}},
  author       = {{Oscarsson, Hannes}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Contract enforcement in Russia and Ukraine}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}