Röstbindningsavtal som maktfördelare i privata aktiebolag – En studie i ljuset av aktiebolagslagens (makt)balans mellan olika aktieägarintressen
(2026) JURM02 20261Faculty of Law
Department of Law
- Abstract
- The shareholders’ agreement serves as a fundamental governance instrument
in company law. A common form is the voting agreement, which regulates
how the parties vote at the general meeting. Companies often consist of different shareholder groups, and the preparatory works indicate that the Swedish Companies Act is intended to maintain a "balance" between different
shareholder interests. Given this, voting agreements emerge as an interesting
contractual mechanism in a corporate law context, since such agreements are
characterized by either dispersing or concentrating power within a company.
This thesis therefore examines voting agreements in private limited liability
companies, focusing on their significance for decision-making, as... (More) - The shareholders’ agreement serves as a fundamental governance instrument
in company law. A common form is the voting agreement, which regulates
how the parties vote at the general meeting. Companies often consist of different shareholder groups, and the preparatory works indicate that the Swedish Companies Act is intended to maintain a "balance" between different
shareholder interests. Given this, voting agreements emerge as an interesting
contractual mechanism in a corporate law context, since such agreements are
characterized by either dispersing or concentrating power within a company.
This thesis therefore examines voting agreements in private limited liability
companies, focusing on their significance for decision-making, as well as the
balance of power and the balance between different shareholder interests.
The study initially examines the structure of company law by analyzing private limited liability companies, their decision-making structure, different shareholder groups, and the majority-minority relationship. It concludes that two shareholder groups generally emerge within a company: a minority and a majority, where the balancing of interests between these two sides appears to be a complex issue in corporate law in light of doctrinal writings and statements in the preparatory works. Central components of the company’s decision-making structure are the general meeting, the majority principle (Sw. "majoritetsprincipen"), and shareholders’ voting rights.
A subsequent analysis of shareholders’ agreements and voting agreements
demonstrates that the distinction between distribution of power and concentration of power is central to the function of voting agreements. Moreover, this distinction is well established in Swedish legal doctrine, where both Roos and Arvidsson have examined the conceptual framework in detail. Both types seek to modify the effects of the majority principle by prescribing a more or less far-reaching distribution of power at the general meeting. However, the extent to which voting agreements influence corporate decision-making depends on several factors, including the corporate law principle of separation (Sw. "den aktiebolagsrättsliga separationsprincipen"), under which such agreements lack direct corporate legal effect.
The conclusion is that the function of voting agreements in private limited
liability companies is contingent on several factors, including the perspective adopted by the parties. Regardless of whether the agreements concentrate or disperse power, voting agreements can influence decision-making and the distribution and balance of power within the company. Consequently, such agreements may in some cases limit the expression of different shareholder interests. Power-concentrating agreements may hinder such an opportunity due to the fact that power is concentrated among a limited group of shareholders, whereas power-dispersing agreements may facilitate a broader accommodation of shareholder interests through their power-balancing effect. (Less) - Abstract (Swedish)
- Aktieägaravtal utgör ett vanligt styrinstrument inom aktiebolagsrätten. En
vanlig variant är röstbindningsavtal som föreskriver hur avtalsparterna ska
rösta vid bolagsstämman. I aktiebolag förekommer ofta olika aktieägargrupper, och av förarbetena att döma ska aktiebolagslagen tillgodose en ”balans”
mellan olika aktieägarintressen. Mot denna bakgrund framstår röstbindnings-
avtal som en intressant avtalsfigur i en bolagsrättslig kontext, eftersom sådana avtal kännetecknas av att sprida eller koncentrera makten i ett aktiebolag. Uppsatsen behandlar därför röstbindningsavtal inom privata aktiebolag, med fokus på vilken betydelse sådana avtal har för beslutsfattandet i bolaget, men även maktbalansen och balansen mellan olika... (More) - Aktieägaravtal utgör ett vanligt styrinstrument inom aktiebolagsrätten. En
vanlig variant är röstbindningsavtal som föreskriver hur avtalsparterna ska
rösta vid bolagsstämman. I aktiebolag förekommer ofta olika aktieägargrupper, och av förarbetena att döma ska aktiebolagslagen tillgodose en ”balans”
mellan olika aktieägarintressen. Mot denna bakgrund framstår röstbindnings-
avtal som en intressant avtalsfigur i en bolagsrättslig kontext, eftersom sådana avtal kännetecknas av att sprida eller koncentrera makten i ett aktiebolag. Uppsatsen behandlar därför röstbindningsavtal inom privata aktiebolag, med fokus på vilken betydelse sådana avtal har för beslutsfattandet i bolaget, men även maktbalansen och balansen mellan olika aktieägarintressen.
Framställningen undersöker inledningsvis aktiebolagsrättens struktur genom
att analysera privata aktiebolag, systematiken i beslutsstrukturen, olika aktieägargrupper och förhållandet mellan majoriteten och minoriteten. Härvid
konstateras att det normalt framträder två aktieägargrupper i ett aktiebolag:
en minoritet och en majoritet, där intresseavvägningen mellan dessa två sidor
framstår som en komplicerad bolagsrättslig fråga i ljuset av doktrin- och förarbetsuttalanden. Bolagets beslutsstruktur består av flera komponenter som är centrala för beslutsfattandet: bolagsstämman, majoritetsprincipen och aktieägares rösträtt.
En efterföljande analys av aktieägaravtal och den närmare innebörden av röstbindningsavtal visar att distinktionen mellan maktspridning och maktkoncentration är central för att beskriva röstbindningsavtalens funktion. Därtill är distinktionen väletablerad i doktrinen, där både Roos och Arvidsson behandlat begreppsbildningen ingående. Gemensamt för maktkoncentrerande och maktspridande röstbindningsavtal är att de syftar till att modifiera effekterna av majoritetsprincipen genom att föreskriva en mer eller mindre långtgående maktdelning vid bolagsstämman. I vilken utsträckning röstbindningsavtal påverkar beslutsfattandet beror på olika faktorer, däribland den aktiebolagsrättsliga separationsprincipen som innebär att avtalet saknar bolagsrättslig verkan.
Sammanfattningsvis visar framställningen att olika aspekter påverkar vilken
funktion ett röstbindningsavtal har i privata aktiebolag, däribland vilket partsperspektiv som intas. Det kan konstateras att ett röstbindningsavtal, oavsett om avtalet sprider eller koncentrerar makten, påverkar bolagets beslutsfattande om det får genomslag. Att röstbindningsavtal koncentrerar eller sprider makten innebär även att maktfördelningen i bolaget påverkas, och likaså maktbalansen. Detta resulterar i att röstbindningsavtal i vissa fall kan försvåra möjligheten för olika aktieägarintressen att komma till uttryck i bolaget. Ett maktkoncentrerande röstbindningsavtal kan försvåra en sådan möjlighet eftersom makten koncentreras hos en begränsad krets av aktieägare, medan maktspridande röstbindningsavtal snarare kan bidra till att fler ägarintressen tillgodoses på grund av avtalens maktutjämnande effekt. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9227374
- author
- Varadi Karlsson, Emilia LU
- supervisor
- organization
- alternative title
- Voting Agreements as Instruments of Power Distribution in Private Limited Liability Companies – A Study in Light of the Swedish Companies Act's Balance of Power Between Shareholder Interests
- course
- JURM02 20261
- year
- 2026
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- associationsrätt, aktiebolagsrätt, aktieägaravtal, röstbindningsavtal, avtalsrätt
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9227374
- date added to LUP
- 2026-06-08 14:44:23
- date last changed
- 2026-06-08 14:44:23
@misc{9227374,
abstract = {{The shareholders’ agreement serves as a fundamental governance instrument
in company law. A common form is the voting agreement, which regulates
how the parties vote at the general meeting. Companies often consist of different shareholder groups, and the preparatory works indicate that the Swedish Companies Act is intended to maintain a "balance" between different
shareholder interests. Given this, voting agreements emerge as an interesting
contractual mechanism in a corporate law context, since such agreements are
characterized by either dispersing or concentrating power within a company.
This thesis therefore examines voting agreements in private limited liability
companies, focusing on their significance for decision-making, as well as the
balance of power and the balance between different shareholder interests.
The study initially examines the structure of company law by analyzing private limited liability companies, their decision-making structure, different shareholder groups, and the majority-minority relationship. It concludes that two shareholder groups generally emerge within a company: a minority and a majority, where the balancing of interests between these two sides appears to be a complex issue in corporate law in light of doctrinal writings and statements in the preparatory works. Central components of the company’s decision-making structure are the general meeting, the majority principle (Sw. "majoritetsprincipen"), and shareholders’ voting rights.
A subsequent analysis of shareholders’ agreements and voting agreements
demonstrates that the distinction between distribution of power and concentration of power is central to the function of voting agreements. Moreover, this distinction is well established in Swedish legal doctrine, where both Roos and Arvidsson have examined the conceptual framework in detail. Both types seek to modify the effects of the majority principle by prescribing a more or less far-reaching distribution of power at the general meeting. However, the extent to which voting agreements influence corporate decision-making depends on several factors, including the corporate law principle of separation (Sw. "den aktiebolagsrättsliga separationsprincipen"), under which such agreements lack direct corporate legal effect.
The conclusion is that the function of voting agreements in private limited
liability companies is contingent on several factors, including the perspective adopted by the parties. Regardless of whether the agreements concentrate or disperse power, voting agreements can influence decision-making and the distribution and balance of power within the company. Consequently, such agreements may in some cases limit the expression of different shareholder interests. Power-concentrating agreements may hinder such an opportunity due to the fact that power is concentrated among a limited group of shareholders, whereas power-dispersing agreements may facilitate a broader accommodation of shareholder interests through their power-balancing effect.}},
author = {{Varadi Karlsson, Emilia}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Röstbindningsavtal som maktfördelare i privata aktiebolag – En studie i ljuset av aktiebolagslagens (makt)balans mellan olika aktieägarintressen}},
year = {{2026}},
}