When sharing platforms fix sellers' prices
(2018) In Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 6(3). p.382-408- Abstract
While price-fixing on platforms can attract severe enforcement action, as shown by the Amazon poster case, a more nuanced picture emerges regarding the fixing of prices for sellers by sharing economy platforms. This article explores possible antitrust responses to such centralized platform-driven price-fixing. The article, first, provides an introduction to the sharing economy and pricing models on such platforms. Then, it investigates the extent to which established case law and frameworks applied in competition law fit with the incentive structure and the operation of such platforms. In the final section, the article highlights key questions from a competition law and from a policy perspective. It shows how such practices defy... (More)
While price-fixing on platforms can attract severe enforcement action, as shown by the Amazon poster case, a more nuanced picture emerges regarding the fixing of prices for sellers by sharing economy platforms. This article explores possible antitrust responses to such centralized platform-driven price-fixing. The article, first, provides an introduction to the sharing economy and pricing models on such platforms. Then, it investigates the extent to which established case law and frameworks applied in competition law fit with the incentive structure and the operation of such platforms. In the final section, the article highlights key questions from a competition law and from a policy perspective. It shows how such practices defy traditional antitrust thinking and give rise to new policy and legal challenges.
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- author
- Nowag, Julian LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2018
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Agency, Employee, Enforcement, Hub-and-spoke, Platforms, Price-fixing, Sharing economy
- in
- Journal of Antitrust Enforcement
- volume
- 6
- issue
- 3
- pages
- 27 pages
- publisher
- Oxford University Press
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85060982597
- ISSN
- 2050-0696
- DOI
- 10.1093/jaenfo/jny007
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 106d1620-f713-4b3e-bd6d-314eb60231dd
- date added to LUP
- 2019-02-15 09:21:08
- date last changed
- 2022-03-17 21:31:05
@article{106d1620-f713-4b3e-bd6d-314eb60231dd,
abstract = {{<p>While price-fixing on platforms can attract severe enforcement action, as shown by the Amazon poster case, a more nuanced picture emerges regarding the fixing of prices for sellers by sharing economy platforms. This article explores possible antitrust responses to such centralized platform-driven price-fixing. The article, first, provides an introduction to the sharing economy and pricing models on such platforms. Then, it investigates the extent to which established case law and frameworks applied in competition law fit with the incentive structure and the operation of such platforms. In the final section, the article highlights key questions from a competition law and from a policy perspective. It shows how such practices defy traditional antitrust thinking and give rise to new policy and legal challenges.</p>}},
author = {{Nowag, Julian}},
issn = {{2050-0696}},
keywords = {{Agency; Employee; Enforcement; Hub-and-spoke; Platforms; Price-fixing; Sharing economy}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{3}},
pages = {{382--408}},
publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
series = {{Journal of Antitrust Enforcement}},
title = {{When sharing platforms fix sellers' prices}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jny007}},
doi = {{10.1093/jaenfo/jny007}},
volume = {{6}},
year = {{2018}},
}