Assortativity Evolving from Social Dilemmas
(2016) In Journal of Theoretical Biology 395. p.194-203- Abstract
- Assortative mechanisms can overcome tragedies of the commons that otherwise result in dilemma situations. Assortativity criteria include various forms of kin selection, greenbeard genes, and reciprocal behaviors, usually presuming an exogenously fixed matching mechanism. Here, we endogenize the matching process with the aim of investigating how assortativity itself, jointly with cooperation, is driven by evolution. Our main finding is that full-or-null assortativities turn out to be long-run stable in most cases, independent of the relative speeds of both processes. The exact incentive structure of the underlying social dilemma matters crucially. The resulting social loss is evaluated for general classes of dilemma games, thus quantifying... (More)
- Assortative mechanisms can overcome tragedies of the commons that otherwise result in dilemma situations. Assortativity criteria include various forms of kin selection, greenbeard genes, and reciprocal behaviors, usually presuming an exogenously fixed matching mechanism. Here, we endogenize the matching process with the aim of investigating how assortativity itself, jointly with cooperation, is driven by evolution. Our main finding is that full-or-null assortativities turn out to be long-run stable in most cases, independent of the relative speeds of both processes. The exact incentive structure of the underlying social dilemma matters crucially. The resulting social loss is evaluated for general classes of dilemma games, thus quantifying to what extent the tragedy of the commons may be endogenously overcome. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/185951de-5dfc-48d4-b34b-20d6344d1e37
- author
- Nax, Heinrich H and Rigos, Alexandros LU
- publishing date
- 2016-04-21
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Cooperation, (co-)evolution, Assortativity, Democratic consensus
- in
- Journal of Theoretical Biology
- volume
- 395
- pages
- 10 pages
- publisher
- Academic Press
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:84958978133
- pmid:26854078
- ISSN
- 0022-5193
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.01.032
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- 185951de-5dfc-48d4-b34b-20d6344d1e37
- date added to LUP
- 2016-10-25 14:32:02
- date last changed
- 2022-04-16 20:17:38
@article{185951de-5dfc-48d4-b34b-20d6344d1e37,
abstract = {{Assortative mechanisms can overcome tragedies of the commons that otherwise result in dilemma situations. Assortativity criteria include various forms of kin selection, greenbeard genes, and reciprocal behaviors, usually presuming an exogenously fixed matching mechanism. Here, we endogenize the matching process with the aim of investigating how assortativity itself, jointly with cooperation, is driven by evolution. Our main finding is that full-or-null assortativities turn out to be long-run stable in most cases, independent of the relative speeds of both processes. The exact incentive structure of the underlying social dilemma matters crucially. The resulting social loss is evaluated for general classes of dilemma games, thus quantifying to what extent the tragedy of the commons may be endogenously overcome.}},
author = {{Nax, Heinrich H and Rigos, Alexandros}},
issn = {{0022-5193}},
keywords = {{Cooperation; (co-)evolution; Assortativity; Democratic consensus}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{04}},
pages = {{194--203}},
publisher = {{Academic Press}},
series = {{Journal of Theoretical Biology}},
title = {{Assortativity Evolving from Social Dilemmas}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.01.032}},
doi = {{10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.01.032}},
volume = {{395}},
year = {{2016}},
}