Collective Guilt Feelings
(2020) In Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy p.228-242- Abstract
- Defenses of the possibility of collective guilt feelings falls roughly into two categories: collectivistic positions that assign guilt feelings to groups as such but play down the experiential component in guilt feelings, and individualistic positions which understand collective guilt feelings in terms of individual experiences. The analogy between collective and individual guilt feelings is examined from two collectivistic viewpoints. It is argued that the functional states of collectives and individuals with respect to guilt are less analogous than collectivists assume. Instead, an individualistic perspectival understanding of collective guilt feelings is proposed. Groups as such cannot feel guilty in the morally relevant sense, but... (More)
- Defenses of the possibility of collective guilt feelings falls roughly into two categories: collectivistic positions that assign guilt feelings to groups as such but play down the experiential component in guilt feelings, and individualistic positions which understand collective guilt feelings in terms of individual experiences. The analogy between collective and individual guilt feelings is examined from two collectivistic viewpoints. It is argued that the functional states of collectives and individuals with respect to guilt are less analogous than collectivists assume. Instead, an individualistic perspectival understanding of collective guilt feelings is proposed. Groups as such cannot feel guilty in the morally relevant sense, but guilt as felt by individuals can have a distinctively collective character, such that the feeling still may be an appropriate response to assignments of collective responsibility. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/9d70325d-4999-4054-a363-6e20dfd63ce3
- author
- Petersson, Björn LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2020
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- host publication
- Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility
- series title
- Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy
- editor
- Tollefsen, Deborah and Bazargan-Forward, Saba
- pages
- 15 pages
- publisher
- Routledge
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85121621051
- ISBN
- 978-1-138-09224-2
- 978-1-315-10760-8
- DOI
- 10.4324/9781315107608
- project
- LGRP - Lund Gothenburg Responsibility Project
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 9d70325d-4999-4054-a363-6e20dfd63ce3
- date added to LUP
- 2019-05-17 13:49:41
- date last changed
- 2024-04-21 06:00:33
@inbook{9d70325d-4999-4054-a363-6e20dfd63ce3,
abstract = {{Defenses of the possibility of collective guilt feelings falls roughly into two categories: collectivistic positions that assign guilt feelings to groups as such but play down the experiential component in guilt feelings, and individualistic positions which understand collective guilt feelings in terms of individual experiences. The analogy between collective and individual guilt feelings is examined from two collectivistic viewpoints. It is argued that the functional states of collectives and individuals with respect to guilt are less analogous than collectivists assume. Instead, an individualistic perspectival understanding of collective guilt feelings is proposed. Groups as such cannot feel guilty in the morally relevant sense, but guilt as felt by individuals can have a distinctively collective character, such that the feeling still may be an appropriate response to assignments of collective responsibility.}},
author = {{Petersson, Björn}},
booktitle = {{Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility}},
editor = {{Tollefsen, Deborah and Bazargan-Forward, Saba}},
isbn = {{978-1-138-09224-2}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{228--242}},
publisher = {{Routledge}},
series = {{Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy}},
title = {{Collective Guilt Feelings}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315107608}},
doi = {{10.4324/9781315107608}},
year = {{2020}},
}