Fitting-attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence Argument
(2018) In Philosophical Quarterly 68(272). p.560-579- Abstract
- A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, its proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good and the other to good-for, or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that whereas the first option faces a counterintuitive scope issue, an attitudinal approach couched in terms of ‘for someone's sake’ attitudes has the unwelcome consequence that whatever is good for someone is also necessarily good. It is argued that this consequence can be avoided if we modify the... (More)
- A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, its proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good and the other to good-for, or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that whereas the first option faces a counterintuitive scope issue, an attitudinal approach couched in terms of ‘for someone's sake’ attitudes has the unwelcome consequence that whatever is good for someone is also necessarily good. It is argued that this consequence can be avoided if we modify the standard way of formulating the fitting-attitude analysis of final impersonal value. (Less)
- Abstract (Swedish)
- A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, it’s proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good, the other to good-for; or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that whereas the first option faces a counter-intuitive scope issue, an attitudinal approach couched in terms of ‘for someone’s sake’ attitudes has the unwelcome consequence that whatever is good for someone is also necessarily good. It is argued that this consequence can be avoided if we modify the... (More)
- A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, it’s proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good, the other to good-for; or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that whereas the first option faces a counter-intuitive scope issue, an attitudinal approach couched in terms of ‘for someone’s sake’ attitudes has the unwelcome consequence that whatever is good for someone is also necessarily good. It is argued that this consequence can be avoided if we modify the standard way of formulating the fitting-attitude analysis of final impersonal value. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/bbd64d96-e1dc-44b0-bd5e-19655820c295
- author
- Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2018-07
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Impersonal value, personal value, good-for, fitting-attitude analysis, for-someone's sake attitudes, Logical Consequence Argument, mood of an attitud
- in
- Philosophical Quarterly
- volume
- 68
- issue
- 272
- pages
- 19 pages
- publisher
- Oxford University Press
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85052436216
- ISSN
- 0031-8094
- DOI
- 10.1093/pq/pqx060
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- bbd64d96-e1dc-44b0-bd5e-19655820c295
- alternative location
- https://www.jstor.org/stable/48556865
- date added to LUP
- 2017-10-05 23:48:09
- date last changed
- 2024-03-25 17:32:12
@article{bbd64d96-e1dc-44b0-bd5e-19655820c295,
abstract = {{A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, its proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good and the other to good-for, or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that whereas the first option faces a counterintuitive scope issue, an attitudinal approach couched in terms of ‘for someone's sake’ attitudes has the unwelcome consequence that whatever is good for someone is also necessarily good. It is argued that this consequence can be avoided if we modify the standard way of formulating the fitting-attitude analysis of final impersonal value.}},
author = {{Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni}},
issn = {{0031-8094}},
keywords = {{Impersonal value; personal value; good-for; fitting-attitude analysis; for-someone's sake attitudes; Logical Consequence Argument; mood of an attitud}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{272}},
pages = {{560--579}},
publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
series = {{Philosophical Quarterly}},
title = {{Fitting-attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence Argument}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqx060}},
doi = {{10.1093/pq/pqx060}},
volume = {{68}},
year = {{2018}},
}