Essays in Strategy-proof Social Choice Theory
(2010)- Abstract
- This thesis consists of two separate papers in strategy-proof social choice theory. The first paper, “Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: Partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness”, generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in three ways: firstly, it is proved that the theorem is still valid when individual preferences belong to a convenient class of partial preferences; secondly, it is shown that every non-dictatorial surjective social choice function is not only manipulable, but it can be manipulated in such a way that some individual obtains either his best or second best alternative; thirdly, we prove a variant of the theorem where the outcomes of the social choice function are subsets of the... (More)
- This thesis consists of two separate papers in strategy-proof social choice theory. The first paper, “Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: Partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness”, generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in three ways: firstly, it is proved that the theorem is still valid when individual preferences belong to a convenient class of partial preferences; secondly, it is shown that every non-dictatorial surjective social choice function is not only manipulable, but it can be manipulated in such a way that some individual obtains either his best or second best alternative; thirdly, we prove a variant of the theorem where the outcomes of the social choice function are subsets of the set of alternatives of an a priori fixed size. In addition, all results are proved not only for finite, but also for countably infinite sets of alternatives. The second paper, “Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods” (coauthored with Lars-Gunnar Svensson), considers a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set of finite categories and characterizes the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over , namely for the three cases when voters’ preferences over are additive, completely separable respectively weakly separable. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1714330
- author
- Reffgen, Alexander ^{LU}
- supervisor
- organization
- publishing date
- 2010
- type
- Thesis
- publication status
- published
- subject
- pages
- 58 pages
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 3246766b-995b-4221-9b9c-43db6c956f15 (old id 1714330)
- date added to LUP
- 2010-11-16 14:00:33
- date last changed
- 2016-09-19 08:45:17
@misc{3246766b-995b-4221-9b9c-43db6c956f15, abstract = {This thesis consists of two separate papers in strategy-proof social choice theory. The first paper, “Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: Partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness”, generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in three ways: firstly, it is proved that the theorem is still valid when individual preferences belong to a convenient class of partial preferences; secondly, it is shown that every non-dictatorial surjective social choice function is not only manipulable, but it can be manipulated in such a way that some individual obtains either his best or second best alternative; thirdly, we prove a variant of the theorem where the outcomes of the social choice function are subsets of the set of alternatives of an a priori fixed size. In addition, all results are proved not only for finite, but also for countably infinite sets of alternatives. The second paper, “Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods” (coauthored with Lars-Gunnar Svensson), considers a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set of finite categories and characterizes the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over , namely for the three cases when voters’ preferences over are additive, completely separable respectively weakly separable.}, author = {Reffgen, Alexander}, language = {eng}, pages = {58}, title = {Essays in Strategy-proof Social Choice Theory}, year = {2010}, }