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The Fall of Reichenbach

Genot, Emmanuel LU (2014) 2014 Meeting of the Nordic Network for Philosophy of Science
Abstract
Reichenbach’s constraint is the methodological imperative formulated by Reichenbach in the following passage:



“If we want to construct a philosophy of science, we have to distinguish

carefully between two kinds of context in which scientific theories may be

considered. The context of discovery is to be separated from the context of

justification; the former belongs to the psychology of scientific discovery,

the latter alone is to be the object of the logic of science.” (Reichenbach,

1938, p. 36.)



Reichenbach’s constraint is usually understood as barring epistemological models from attempting rational reconstructions of discovery processes. This paper... (More)
Reichenbach’s constraint is the methodological imperative formulated by Reichenbach in the following passage:



“If we want to construct a philosophy of science, we have to distinguish

carefully between two kinds of context in which scientific theories may be

considered. The context of discovery is to be separated from the context of

justification; the former belongs to the psychology of scientific discovery,

the latter alone is to be the object of the logic of science.” (Reichenbach,

1938, p. 36.)



Reichenbach’s constraint is usually understood as barring epistemological models from attempting rational reconstructions of discovery processes. This paper shows that Reichenbach’s constraint also bars epistemological models from capturing inquiry processes as genuine learning processes. (Less)
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Contribution to conference
publication status
unpublished
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conference name
2014 Meeting of the Nordic Network for Philosophy of Science
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
55f6f361-bcd9-41c8-99a5-55319cb04ef4 (old id 5038701)
date added to LUP
2015-02-02 08:01:26
date last changed
2016-04-16 11:43:59
@misc{55f6f361-bcd9-41c8-99a5-55319cb04ef4,
  abstract     = {Reichenbach’s constraint is the methodological imperative formulated by Reichenbach in the following passage: <br/><br>
<br/><br>
“If we want to construct a philosophy of science, we have to distinguish <br/><br>
carefully between two kinds of context in which scientific theories may be <br/><br>
considered. The context of discovery is to be separated from the context of <br/><br>
justification; the former belongs to the psychology of scientific discovery, <br/><br>
the latter alone is to be the object of the logic of science.” (Reichenbach, <br/><br>
1938, p. 36.) <br/><br>
<br/><br>
Reichenbach’s constraint is usually understood as barring epistemological models from attempting rational reconstructions of discovery processes. This paper shows that Reichenbach’s constraint also bars epistemological models from capturing inquiry processes as genuine learning processes.},
  author       = {Genot, Emmanuel},
  language     = {eng},
  title        = {The Fall of Reichenbach},
  year         = {2014},
}