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Compromises and Rewards: Stable and Non-manipulable Probabilistic Pairing

Gudmundsson, Jens LU (2015) In Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University
Abstract
Can we reconcile stability with non-manipulability in pairing problems by selecting lotteries over matchings?We examine the problem of eliciting preferences to make pairs as introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). We develop ex-ante notions of stability and non-manipulability that are parameterized by collections of utility functions. In particular, we study the collection of utility functions with increasing differences for which stability and non-manipulability turn out to characterize Compromises and Rewards. This is a novel rule that is fundamentally different from the one that has attracted most attention in the literature, Deferred Acceptance.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Working Paper
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Rewards, Compromises, Non-manipulability, Stability, Lottery, Pairing
in
Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University
issue
32
pages
27 pages
publisher
Department of Economics, Lund Universtiy
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
e0077c87-0689-4703-9264-1abadeb554f1 (old id 8230888)
alternative location
http://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2015_032.htm
date added to LUP
2015-11-25 16:33:07
date last changed
2016-04-16 09:44:39
@misc{e0077c87-0689-4703-9264-1abadeb554f1,
  abstract     = {Can we reconcile stability with non-manipulability in pairing problems by selecting lotteries over matchings?We examine the problem of eliciting preferences to make pairs as introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). We develop ex-ante notions of stability and non-manipulability that are parameterized by collections of utility functions. In particular, we study the collection of utility functions with increasing differences for which stability and non-manipulability turn out to characterize Compromises and Rewards. This is a novel rule that is fundamentally different from the one that has attracted most attention in the literature, Deferred Acceptance.},
  author       = {Gudmundsson, Jens},
  keyword      = {Rewards,Compromises,Non-manipulability,Stability,Lottery,Pairing},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {32},
  pages        = {27},
  publisher    = {ARRAY(0x826a3c8)},
  series       = {Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University},
  title        = {Compromises and Rewards: Stable and Non-manipulable Probabilistic Pairing},
  year         = {2015},
}