Forgiveness and moral luck
(2024) p.227-251- Abstract
Proceeding from the assumptions that forgiveness is at least sometimes elective and that it changes the normative relations between victims and wrongdoers, this chapter argues that our practice of forgiveness is subject to an overlooked form of moral luck, forgiveness luck. Forgiveness luck is introduced via reflection on 'differential forgiveness', where, of two equally culpable and remorseful agents, one is forgiven and the other not, and both justifiably so. In being forgiven-at least if forgiveness is normatively significant-one undergoes a positive alteration in one's moral status, that is, a positive alteration in one's permissions, obligations, or interpersonal reasons that is implied by one's being the target of a positive moral... (More)
Proceeding from the assumptions that forgiveness is at least sometimes elective and that it changes the normative relations between victims and wrongdoers, this chapter argues that our practice of forgiveness is subject to an overlooked form of moral luck, forgiveness luck. Forgiveness luck is introduced via reflection on 'differential forgiveness', where, of two equally culpable and remorseful agents, one is forgiven and the other not, and both justifiably so. In being forgiven-at least if forgiveness is normatively significant-one undergoes a positive alteration in one's moral status, that is, a positive alteration in one's permissions, obligations, or interpersonal reasons that is implied by one's being the target of a positive moral responsibility response. It is also illustrated how responsibility responses other than forgiveness are candidate determinates of one's moral status. Consequently, this chapter outlines a capacious conception of moral luck according to which moral statuses beyond blameworthiness (and praiseworthiness) are determinable by factors beyond one's control. The capacious conception avoids rendering the existence of moral luck a trivial matter (as it preserves the distinction between moral luck and morally significant plain luck) and-at least if moral responsibility is understood in terms of accountability-preserves continuity with narrower conceptions of moral luck.
(Less)
- author
- Telech, Daniel LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2024-10
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Accountability, Blame, Forgiveness, Moral luck, Moral repair, Relationship
- host publication
- Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics : Volume 14 - Volume 14
- pages
- 25 pages
- publisher
- Oxford University Press
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85207620952
- ISBN
- 9780198930785
- 9780198930815
- DOI
- 10.1093/oso/9780198930785.003.0012
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 05fb5a56-e790-44bc-aa38-513b178e59d1
- date added to LUP
- 2024-12-10 13:46:23
- date last changed
- 2025-07-09 06:50:12
@inbook{05fb5a56-e790-44bc-aa38-513b178e59d1,
abstract = {{<p>Proceeding from the assumptions that forgiveness is at least sometimes elective and that it changes the normative relations between victims and wrongdoers, this chapter argues that our practice of forgiveness is subject to an overlooked form of moral luck, forgiveness luck. Forgiveness luck is introduced via reflection on 'differential forgiveness', where, of two equally culpable and remorseful agents, one is forgiven and the other not, and both justifiably so. In being forgiven-at least if forgiveness is normatively significant-one undergoes a positive alteration in one's moral status, that is, a positive alteration in one's permissions, obligations, or interpersonal reasons that is implied by one's being the target of a positive moral responsibility response. It is also illustrated how responsibility responses other than forgiveness are candidate determinates of one's moral status. Consequently, this chapter outlines a capacious conception of moral luck according to which moral statuses beyond blameworthiness (and praiseworthiness) are determinable by factors beyond one's control. The capacious conception avoids rendering the existence of moral luck a trivial matter (as it preserves the distinction between moral luck and morally significant plain luck) and-at least if moral responsibility is understood in terms of accountability-preserves continuity with narrower conceptions of moral luck.</p>}},
author = {{Telech, Daniel}},
booktitle = {{Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics : Volume 14}},
isbn = {{9780198930785}},
keywords = {{Accountability; Blame; Forgiveness; Moral luck; Moral repair; Relationship}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{227--251}},
publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
title = {{Forgiveness and moral luck}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198930785.003.0012}},
doi = {{10.1093/oso/9780198930785.003.0012}},
year = {{2024}},
}