Introduction
(2022) p.1-16- Abstract
This introductory essay explains the motivation behind this collection and provides summaries of the individual contributions to this volume. Bernard Williams is often regarded as a merely negative or critical philosopher, with no distinctive philosophical approach of his own. This perspective ignores Williams’s efforts to make positive contributions to several areas in ethics and metaethics, including debates on the problem of free will and moral responsibility, the nature of moral emotions and reactive attitudes, the scope of rational motivations in morality, and the possibility of moral knowledge, among other topics. The aim of this collection is to bring together chapters that focus on Williams’s conceptual and methodological... (More)
This introductory essay explains the motivation behind this collection and provides summaries of the individual contributions to this volume. Bernard Williams is often regarded as a merely negative or critical philosopher, with no distinctive philosophical approach of his own. This perspective ignores Williams’s efforts to make positive contributions to several areas in ethics and metaethics, including debates on the problem of free will and moral responsibility, the nature of moral emotions and reactive attitudes, the scope of rational motivations in morality, and the possibility of moral knowledge, among other topics. The aim of this collection is to bring together chapters that focus on Williams’s conceptual and methodological innovations and on the substantive and original ideas that he developed as part of his distinctive philosophical outlook. The hope is that these chapters will add new strokes to the emerging picture of Williams’s philosophy as a fully fledged alternative approach in ethics.
(Less)
- author
- Szigeti, András LU and Talbert, Matthew LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2022-01-01
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Anti-theory, Bernard Williams, Ethics, Morality system, Skepticism
- host publication
- Morality and Agency : Themes from Bernard Williams - Themes from Bernard Williams
- pages
- 16 pages
- publisher
- Oxford University Press
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:105021761424
- ISBN
- 9780197626566
- 9780197626597
- DOI
- 10.1093/oso/9780197626566.003.0001
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 18d51ddc-8bbf-4ca4-8483-791db7da9a83
- date added to LUP
- 2026-02-16 15:14:07
- date last changed
- 2026-02-23 08:31:56
@inbook{18d51ddc-8bbf-4ca4-8483-791db7da9a83,
abstract = {{<p>This introductory essay explains the motivation behind this collection and provides summaries of the individual contributions to this volume. Bernard Williams is often regarded as a merely negative or critical philosopher, with no distinctive philosophical approach of his own. This perspective ignores Williams’s efforts to make positive contributions to several areas in ethics and metaethics, including debates on the problem of free will and moral responsibility, the nature of moral emotions and reactive attitudes, the scope of rational motivations in morality, and the possibility of moral knowledge, among other topics. The aim of this collection is to bring together chapters that focus on Williams’s conceptual and methodological innovations and on the substantive and original ideas that he developed as part of his distinctive philosophical outlook. The hope is that these chapters will add new strokes to the emerging picture of Williams’s philosophy as a fully fledged alternative approach in ethics.</p>}},
author = {{Szigeti, András and Talbert, Matthew}},
booktitle = {{Morality and Agency : Themes from Bernard Williams}},
isbn = {{9780197626566}},
keywords = {{Anti-theory; Bernard Williams; Ethics; Morality system; Skepticism}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{01}},
pages = {{1--16}},
publisher = {{Oxford University Press}},
title = {{Introduction}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197626566.003.0001}},
doi = {{10.1093/oso/9780197626566.003.0001}},
year = {{2022}},
}