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For Kevin's Sake

Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni LU (2011) 1. p.1-18
Abstract
The idiom ‘for someone’s sake’ plays a central role in recent attempts to understand the distinction between impersonal values and personal values—e.g. between what is valuable or good, period, and what is valuable for or good for someone. In the first section three historical approaches to this distinction are outlined. Section 2 presents a modified fitting-attitude (FA) analysis of final ‘value-for’ interpreting value-for in terms of there being a reason to favour something ‘for someone’s sake’. Section 3 outlines two arguments against this sort of modified analysis, and then indicates what the rejection of these arguments would involve. This section also identifies an ambiguity in the analysis deriving from the fact that ‘sake’ may be... (More)
The idiom ‘for someone’s sake’ plays a central role in recent attempts to understand the distinction between impersonal values and personal values—e.g. between what is valuable or good, period, and what is valuable for or good for someone. In the first section three historical approaches to this distinction are outlined. Section 2 presents a modified fitting-attitude (FA) analysis of final ‘value-for’ interpreting value-for in terms of there being a reason to favour something ‘for someone’s sake’. Section 3 outlines two arguments against this sort of modified analysis, and then indicates what the rejection of these arguments would involve. This section also identifies an ambiguity in the analysis deriving from the fact that ‘sake’ may be used either evaluatively or non-evaluatively (descriptively). In Section 4, the modified FA analysis is further clarified. Section 5 focuses on Kevin Mulligan’s recent suggestion that we are struck by personal value; finally, in Section 6, it is shown that an FA analysis admitting of two varieties of goodness may help us understand a certain kind of case that appears paradoxical as long as we assume that there is good, period, and no good-for (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
publication status
published
subject
keywords
value-for, good-for, fitting-attitude analysis, sake, personal value, normativity, Krister Bykvist, Kevin Mulligan
host publication
Philosophical papers to Kevin Mulligan
editor
Reboul, Anne
volume
1
pages
1 - 18
publisher
Université de Genève, Faculté des Lettres, Dep de Philosophie
external identifiers
  • other:http://www.philosophie.ch/kevin/festschrift/
project
On Our Good Reasons
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
33f6b912-0c3c-4893-9042-d1ddc7886fd2 (old id 1982481)
date added to LUP
2016-04-04 12:08:58
date last changed
2018-11-21 21:09:16
@inbook{33f6b912-0c3c-4893-9042-d1ddc7886fd2,
  abstract     = {{The idiom ‘for someone’s sake’ plays a central role in recent attempts to understand the distinction between impersonal values and personal values—e.g. between what is valuable or good, period, and what is valuable for or good for someone. In the first section three historical approaches to this distinction are outlined. Section 2 presents a modified fitting-attitude (FA) analysis of final ‘value-for’ interpreting value-for in terms of there being a reason to favour something ‘for someone’s sake’. Section 3 outlines two arguments against this sort of modified analysis, and then indicates what the rejection of these arguments would involve. This section also identifies an ambiguity in the analysis deriving from the fact that ‘sake’ may be used either evaluatively or non-evaluatively (descriptively). In Section 4, the modified FA analysis is further clarified. Section 5 focuses on Kevin Mulligan’s recent suggestion that we are struck by personal value; finally, in Section 6, it is shown that an FA analysis admitting of two varieties of goodness may help us understand a certain kind of case that appears paradoxical as long as we assume that there is good, period, and no good-for}},
  author       = {{Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni}},
  booktitle    = {{Philosophical papers to Kevin Mulligan}},
  editor       = {{Reboul, Anne}},
  keywords     = {{value-for; good-for; fitting-attitude analysis; sake; personal value; normativity; Krister Bykvist; Kevin Mulligan}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  pages        = {{1--18}},
  publisher    = {{Université de Genève, Faculté des Lettres, Dep de Philosophie}},
  title        = {{For Kevin's Sake}},
  volume       = {{1}},
  year         = {{2011}},
}