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A Reliabilism without Counterexamples and Reference Class Problems

Ask Zaar, Balder Edmund LU orcid (2025) In Episteme p.1-21
Abstract
In this article, I present a modified reliabilist theory of knowledge which purports to solve many of the problems currently facing standard reliabilism. With the help of a dispositionally construed reliabilist theory of knowledge and justification (DRK and DRJ), tentative responses to the following problems for reliabilism are offered: The New Evil Demon Problem, The Clairvoyance Problem, The Mr. Truetemp Problem, The Gettier Problem, Barn Cases (Brandom’s and Goldman’s), and The Lottery Problem. Lastly, I argue that, despite diverging from the letter of standard reliabilism, DRK and DRJ remain within the spirit of reliabilist epistemology
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
epub
subject
keywords
Reliabilism, dispositions, dispositional reliabilism, propensity, solutions
in
Episteme
pages
21 pages
publisher
Edinburgh University Press
external identifiers
  • scopus:105009152109
ISSN
1750-0117
DOI
10.1017/epi.2025.10045
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
1fd1b50d-c1f5-4e9a-a0b2-08b9434a0e0b
date added to LUP
2025-07-01 10:07:24
date last changed
2025-07-15 17:53:49
@article{1fd1b50d-c1f5-4e9a-a0b2-08b9434a0e0b,
  abstract     = {{In this article, I present a modified reliabilist theory of knowledge which purports to solve many of the problems currently facing standard reliabilism. With the help of a dispositionally construed reliabilist theory of knowledge and justification (DRK and DRJ), tentative responses to the following problems for reliabilism are offered: The New Evil Demon Problem, The Clairvoyance Problem, The Mr. Truetemp Problem, The Gettier Problem, Barn Cases (Brandom’s and Goldman’s), and The Lottery Problem. Lastly, I argue that, despite diverging from the letter of standard reliabilism, DRK and DRJ remain within the spirit of reliabilist epistemology}},
  author       = {{Ask Zaar, Balder Edmund}},
  issn         = {{1750-0117}},
  keywords     = {{Reliabilism; dispositions; dispositional reliabilism; propensity; solutions}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  month        = {{06}},
  pages        = {{1--21}},
  publisher    = {{Edinburgh University Press}},
  series       = {{Episteme}},
  title        = {{A Reliabilism without Counterexamples and Reference Class Problems}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2025.10045}},
  doi          = {{10.1017/epi.2025.10045}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}