Two intuitions about free will—Some afterthoughts
(2024) In Theoria (Sweden)- Abstract
In 2014, Christian List and I published a paper that delineated our view regarding what it takes for an agent to act freely. We suggested that this requires the action to be endorsed by the agent and caused by this endorsement and yet not be necessitated. Free action requires indeterminism at the agential level—the kind of indeterminism that is compatible with physical determinism. I still think that our proposal was on the right track, but I believe it needs elaboration. As we already noted in the paper, our formal modelling—a standard branching model—was too extensional, and therefore in need of revision. Also, on a substantive side, what we say about the causal component of our proposal does not quite take care of the danger of... (More)
In 2014, Christian List and I published a paper that delineated our view regarding what it takes for an agent to act freely. We suggested that this requires the action to be endorsed by the agent and caused by this endorsement and yet not be necessitated. Free action requires indeterminism at the agential level—the kind of indeterminism that is compatible with physical determinism. I still think that our proposal was on the right track, but I believe it needs elaboration. As we already noted in the paper, our formal modelling—a standard branching model—was too extensional, and therefore in need of revision. Also, on a substantive side, what we say about the causal component of our proposal does not quite take care of the danger of ‘flukishness’ of an undetermined action. It was this threat to agential control that the requirement of causation by endorsement was meant to disarm in the first place. But the threat still remains and needs to be confronted. Revising the formal model and finding a solution to the problem of flukishness are my two objectives in this paper.
(Less)
- author
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2024
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Theoria (Sweden)
- publisher
- John Wiley & Sons Inc.
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85198717594
- ISSN
- 0040-5825
- DOI
- 10.1111/theo.12550
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- additional info
- Publisher Copyright: © 2024 The Author(s). Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stiftelsen Theoria.
- id
- 23b2c23e-d48e-4b96-9e99-96d31a0b0a91
- date added to LUP
- 2024-11-27 12:14:03
- date last changed
- 2025-04-04 14:22:44
@article{23b2c23e-d48e-4b96-9e99-96d31a0b0a91,
abstract = {{<p>In 2014, Christian List and I published a paper that delineated our view regarding what it takes for an agent to act freely. We suggested that this requires the action to be endorsed by the agent and caused by this endorsement and yet not be necessitated. Free action requires indeterminism at the agential level—the kind of indeterminism that is compatible with physical determinism. I still think that our proposal was on the right track, but I believe it needs elaboration. As we already noted in the paper, our formal modelling—a standard branching model—was too extensional, and therefore in need of revision. Also, on a substantive side, what we say about the causal component of our proposal does not quite take care of the danger of ‘flukishness’ of an undetermined action. It was this threat to agential control that the requirement of causation by endorsement was meant to disarm in the first place. But the threat still remains and needs to be confronted. Revising the formal model and finding a solution to the problem of flukishness are my two objectives in this paper.</p>}},
author = {{Rabinowicz, Wlodek}},
issn = {{0040-5825}},
language = {{eng}},
publisher = {{John Wiley & Sons Inc.}},
series = {{Theoria (Sweden)}},
title = {{Two intuitions about free will—Some afterthoughts}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/theo.12550}},
doi = {{10.1111/theo.12550}},
year = {{2024}},
}