Why Anticorruption Reform Fails: Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem
Persson, Anna ; Rothstein, Bo and Teorell, Jan LU
(2013)
In Governance
26(3).
p.449-471
- Abstract
- With an increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development, strategies to fight it are now a top priority in policy circles. Yet, in countries ridden with systemic corruption, few successes have resulted from the investment. On the basis of an interview study conducted in Kenya and Uganda—two arguably typically thoroughly corrupt countries—we argue that part of an explanation to why anticorruption reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail is that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. More specifically, the analysis reveals that while contemporary anticorruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal–agent problem,... (More)
- With an increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development, strategies to fight it are now a top priority in policy circles. Yet, in countries ridden with systemic corruption, few successes have resulted from the investment. On the basis of an interview study conducted in Kenya and Uganda—two arguably typically thoroughly corrupt countries—we argue that part of an explanation to why anticorruption reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail is that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. More specifically, the analysis reveals that while contemporary anticorruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal–agent problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption rather resembles a collective action problem. This, in turn, leads to a breakdown of any anticorruption reform that builds on the principal–agent framework, taking the existence of noncorruptible so-called principals for granted. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/3630113
- author
- Persson, Anna
; Rothstein, Bo
and Teorell, Jan
LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2013
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Governance
- volume
- 26
- issue
- 3
- pages
- 449 - 471
- publisher
- Wiley-Blackwell
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000319217900006
- scopus:84878144512
- ISSN
- 1468-0491
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01604.x
- project
- The Quality of Government Institute
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- d4aad070-3749-4c3d-b456-b8c76978c788 (old id 3630113)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 10:36:57
- date last changed
- 2022-04-27 23:32:06
@article{d4aad070-3749-4c3d-b456-b8c76978c788,
abstract = {{With an increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development, strategies to fight it are now a top priority in policy circles. Yet, in countries ridden with systemic corruption, few successes have resulted from the investment. On the basis of an interview study conducted in Kenya and Uganda—two arguably typically thoroughly corrupt countries—we argue that part of an explanation to why anticorruption reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail is that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. More specifically, the analysis reveals that while contemporary anticorruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal–agent problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption rather resembles a collective action problem. This, in turn, leads to a breakdown of any anticorruption reform that builds on the principal–agent framework, taking the existence of noncorruptible so-called principals for granted.}},
author = {{Persson, Anna and Rothstein, Bo and Teorell, Jan}},
issn = {{1468-0491}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{3}},
pages = {{449--471}},
publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
series = {{Governance}},
title = {{Why Anticorruption Reform Fails: Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01604.x}},
doi = {{10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01604.x}},
volume = {{26}},
year = {{2013}},
}