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Punishment Moralism

MirzaeiGhazi, Shervin LU (2024) In Ratio Juris 37(3). p.230-247
Abstract

In this paper, I try to reconcile the vulgar (normative) definition of punishment with the positivistic (purely descriptive) definition that separates the ethics of punishment from its definition—punishment positivism. I will argue that although the vulgar definition has critical issues, this does not mean that we should stop using normative concepts in the definition of punishment. I will attempt this reconciliation by considering one of the prime arguments in favour of punishment positivism—namely, definitional stop—and show why it doesn't work. I will proceed by presenting a functional argument in favour of what I call punishment moralism: the idea that punishment should be considered as a response to perceived wrongdoing. This... (More)

In this paper, I try to reconcile the vulgar (normative) definition of punishment with the positivistic (purely descriptive) definition that separates the ethics of punishment from its definition—punishment positivism. I will argue that although the vulgar definition has critical issues, this does not mean that we should stop using normative concepts in the definition of punishment. I will attempt this reconciliation by considering one of the prime arguments in favour of punishment positivism—namely, definitional stop—and show why it doesn't work. I will proceed by presenting a functional argument in favour of what I call punishment moralism: the idea that punishment should be considered as a response to perceived wrongdoing. This definition, while using normative concepts, still remains descriptive. In this way, I hope to be able to solve the problem of both views by combining their insights.

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Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Ratio Juris
volume
37
issue
3
pages
18 pages
publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
external identifiers
  • scopus:85201074036
ISSN
0952-1917
DOI
10.1111/raju.12416
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
4f97a335-3786-4317-b76d-38de77d44a59
date added to LUP
2024-09-02 15:45:40
date last changed
2024-09-02 15:47:00
@article{4f97a335-3786-4317-b76d-38de77d44a59,
  abstract     = {{<p>In this paper, I try to reconcile the vulgar (normative) definition of punishment with the positivistic (purely descriptive) definition that separates the ethics of punishment from its definition—punishment positivism. I will argue that although the vulgar definition has critical issues, this does not mean that we should stop using normative concepts in the definition of punishment. I will attempt this reconciliation by considering one of the prime arguments in favour of punishment positivism—namely, definitional stop—and show why it doesn't work. I will proceed by presenting a functional argument in favour of what I call punishment moralism: the idea that punishment should be considered as a response to perceived wrongdoing. This definition, while using normative concepts, still remains descriptive. In this way, I hope to be able to solve the problem of both views by combining their insights.</p>}},
  author       = {{MirzaeiGhazi, Shervin}},
  issn         = {{0952-1917}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{230--247}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
  series       = {{Ratio Juris}},
  title        = {{Punishment Moralism}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/raju.12416}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/raju.12416}},
  volume       = {{37}},
  year         = {{2024}},
}