Rejecting norms of standing for private blame
(2024) In Ratio- Abstract
We argue that we should be sceptical towards the claim that there is such a thing as the standing to blame someone privately, understood in terms of holding the attitude of blame. Key features of the idea about standing to blame do not apply to private blame. For example, we argue that private blame is not the exercise of some normative power, and it is not even pro tanto wrong for a hypocrite to privately blame a blameworthy agent. Thus, contrary to the prevailing sentiment, it is doubtful that there are conditions of standing for private blame. Importantly, our conclusions leave the idea of standing to blame intact when it comes to overt blame, which is understood as something voluntary.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/549ec71a-543a-493b-952e-f07f60f89ff2
- author
- Johansson Werkmäster, Marta LU and Werkmäster, Jakob LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2024
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- epub
- subject
- keywords
- attention, blame, hypocrisy, rational control, standing, volitional control
- in
- Ratio
- publisher
- Wiley-Blackwell
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85200042488
- ISSN
- 0034-0006
- DOI
- 10.1111/rati.12420
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 549ec71a-543a-493b-952e-f07f60f89ff2
- date added to LUP
- 2024-11-11 15:31:55
- date last changed
- 2025-04-04 14:02:40
@article{549ec71a-543a-493b-952e-f07f60f89ff2,
abstract = {{<p>We argue that we should be sceptical towards the claim that there is such a thing as the standing to blame someone privately, understood in terms of holding the attitude of blame. Key features of the idea about standing to blame do not apply to private blame. For example, we argue that private blame is not the exercise of some normative power, and it is not even pro tanto wrong for a hypocrite to privately blame a blameworthy agent. Thus, contrary to the prevailing sentiment, it is doubtful that there are conditions of standing for private blame. Importantly, our conclusions leave the idea of standing to blame intact when it comes to overt blame, which is understood as something voluntary.</p>}},
author = {{Johansson Werkmäster, Marta and Werkmäster, Jakob}},
issn = {{0034-0006}},
keywords = {{attention; blame; hypocrisy; rational control; standing; volitional control}},
language = {{eng}},
publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
series = {{Ratio}},
title = {{Rejecting norms of standing for private blame}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rati.12420}},
doi = {{10.1111/rati.12420}},
year = {{2024}},
}