Butterfly attack : Adversarial manipulation of temporal properties of cyber-physical systems
(2019) 40th IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium, RTSS 2019 In Proceedings - Real-Time Systems Symposium 2019-December. p.93-106- Abstract
Increasing internet connectivity poses an existential threat for cyber-physical systems. Securing these safety-critical systems becomes an important challenge. Cyber-physical systems often comprise several control applications that are implemented on shared platforms where both high and low criticality tasks execute together (to reduce cost). Such resource sharing may lead to complex timing behaviors and, in turn, counter-intuitive timing anomalies that can be exploited by adversaries to destabilize a critical control system, resulting in irreversible consequences. We introduce the butterfly attack, a new attack scenario against cyber-physical systems that carefully exploits the sensitivity of control applications with respect to the... (More)
Increasing internet connectivity poses an existential threat for cyber-physical systems. Securing these safety-critical systems becomes an important challenge. Cyber-physical systems often comprise several control applications that are implemented on shared platforms where both high and low criticality tasks execute together (to reduce cost). Such resource sharing may lead to complex timing behaviors and, in turn, counter-intuitive timing anomalies that can be exploited by adversaries to destabilize a critical control system, resulting in irreversible consequences. We introduce the butterfly attack, a new attack scenario against cyber-physical systems that carefully exploits the sensitivity of control applications with respect to the implementation on the underlying execution platforms. We illustrate the possibility of such attacks using two case-studies from the automotive and avionic domains.
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- author
- Mahfouzi, Rouhollah ; Aminifar, Amir LU ; Samii, Soheil ; Payer, Mathias ; Eles, Petru and Peng, Zebo
- publishing date
- 2019-12
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Control applications, Jitter, Latency, Real time scheduling, Resource sharing, Security attack, Stability analysis, Time-delay
- host publication
- Proceedings - 2019 IEEE 40th Real-Time Systems Symposium, RTSS 2019
- series title
- Proceedings - Real-Time Systems Symposium
- volume
- 2019-December
- article number
- 9052127
- pages
- 14 pages
- publisher
- IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
- conference name
- 40th IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium, RTSS 2019
- conference location
- Hong Kong, China
- conference dates
- 2019-12-03 - 2019-12-06
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85083274092
- ISSN
- 1052-8725
- ISBN
- 9781728144030
- DOI
- 10.1109/RTSS46320.2019.00019
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- additional info
- Publisher Copyright: © 2019 IEEE.
- id
- ad702ffd-0e74-470b-86e9-0f8fecee3728
- date added to LUP
- 2022-02-05 01:18:05
- date last changed
- 2022-04-22 08:03:51
@inproceedings{ad702ffd-0e74-470b-86e9-0f8fecee3728, abstract = {{<p>Increasing internet connectivity poses an existential threat for cyber-physical systems. Securing these safety-critical systems becomes an important challenge. Cyber-physical systems often comprise several control applications that are implemented on shared platforms where both high and low criticality tasks execute together (to reduce cost). Such resource sharing may lead to complex timing behaviors and, in turn, counter-intuitive timing anomalies that can be exploited by adversaries to destabilize a critical control system, resulting in irreversible consequences. We introduce the butterfly attack, a new attack scenario against cyber-physical systems that carefully exploits the sensitivity of control applications with respect to the implementation on the underlying execution platforms. We illustrate the possibility of such attacks using two case-studies from the automotive and avionic domains.</p>}}, author = {{Mahfouzi, Rouhollah and Aminifar, Amir and Samii, Soheil and Payer, Mathias and Eles, Petru and Peng, Zebo}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings - 2019 IEEE 40th Real-Time Systems Symposium, RTSS 2019}}, isbn = {{9781728144030}}, issn = {{1052-8725}}, keywords = {{Control applications; Jitter; Latency; Real time scheduling; Resource sharing; Security attack; Stability analysis; Time-delay}}, language = {{eng}}, pages = {{93--106}}, publisher = {{IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.}}, series = {{Proceedings - Real-Time Systems Symposium}}, title = {{Butterfly attack : Adversarial manipulation of temporal properties of cyber-physical systems}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/RTSS46320.2019.00019}}, doi = {{10.1109/RTSS46320.2019.00019}}, volume = {{2019-December}}, year = {{2019}}, }