Nietzsche's Kind of Consciousness
(2025) In Journal of Nietzsche Studies 56(1). p.67-81- Abstract
This article critically examines two claims Mattia Riccardi ascribes to Nietzsche in his 2021 book Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology. The first is that Nietzsche’s main notion of consciousness should be interpreted as Rconsciousness. Rconsciousness is an awareness of a mental state or process that is achieved when that state is linguistically interpreted by another state. This article finds that Riccardi’s account commits to two instances of states becoming conscious and to two kinds of consciousness. The second claim is that Nietzsche advances a pluralism about consciousness, endorsing a perceptual... (More)
This article critically examines two claims Mattia Riccardi ascribes to Nietzsche in his 2021 book Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology. The first is that Nietzsche’s main notion of consciousness should be interpreted as Rconsciousness. Rconsciousness is an awareness of a mental state or process that is achieved when that state is linguistically interpreted by another state. This article finds that Riccardi’s account commits to two instances of states becoming conscious and to two kinds of consciousness. The second claim is that Nietzsche advances a pluralism about consciousness, endorsing a perceptual form of consciousness, Pconsciousness, and a qualitative consciousness of sensations, Qconsciousness. As Riccardi’s account offers no criteria for what it takes to be conscious per se, it is unclear what the pluralism he ascribes to Nietzsche amounts to. Moreover, this article finds that Nietzsche offers no positive reason to conceive any candidate mental phenomena as conscious other than those that are linguistically-reflexively conscious.
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- author
- Minden Ribeiro, Max LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2025
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Nietzsche, Riccardi, consciousness, pluralism, higher-order thought (HOT) theory
- in
- Journal of Nietzsche Studies
- volume
- 56
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 67 - 81
- publisher
- Penn State University Press
- ISSN
- 0968-8005
- DOI
- 10.5325/jnietstud.56.1.0067
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- additional info
- The article anchors a discussion section, with responses from João Constâncio and Mattia Riccardi
- id
- c5296f76-b390-4d2e-b6be-a88fd0aefb73
- date added to LUP
- 2025-02-06 21:59:31
- date last changed
- 2025-05-05 14:38:42
@article{c5296f76-b390-4d2e-b6be-a88fd0aefb73, abstract = {{<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm; font-size: medium; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">This article critically examines two claims Mattia Riccardi ascribes to Nietzsche in his 2021 book<i> Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology</i>. The first is that Nietzsche’s main notion of consciousness should be interpreted as <sup>R</sup>consciousness. <sup>R</sup>consciousness is an awareness of a mental state or process that is achieved when that state is linguistically interpreted by another state. This article finds that Riccardi’s account commits to two instances of states becoming conscious and to two kinds of consciousness. The second claim is that Nietzsche advances a pluralism about consciousness, endorsing a perceptual form of consciousness, <sup>P</sup>consciousness, and a qualitative consciousness of sensations, <sup>Q</sup>consciousness. As Riccardi’s account offers no criteria for what it takes to be conscious <i>per se</i>, it is unclear what the pluralism he ascribes to Nietzsche amounts to. Moreover, this article finds that Nietzsche offers no positive reason to conceive any candidate mental phenomena as conscious other than those that are linguistically-reflexively conscious.</p>}}, author = {{Minden Ribeiro, Max}}, issn = {{0968-8005}}, keywords = {{Nietzsche; Riccardi; consciousness; pluralism; higher-order thought (HOT) theory}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{67--81}}, publisher = {{Penn State University Press}}, series = {{Journal of Nietzsche Studies}}, title = {{Nietzsche's Kind of Consciousness}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jnietstud.56.1.0067}}, doi = {{10.5325/jnietstud.56.1.0067}}, volume = {{56}}, year = {{2025}}, }