Can two wrongs make it right? Reconsidering minimum resale price maintenance in the light of Allianz Hungaria
(2015) In European Competition Journal 11(2/3). p.340-366- Abstract
- Minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) agreements constitute hard-core vertical restraints and are treated as object restrictions in EU competition law. This article suggests that the time may have come where this approach is revised. After, first, discussing the economic theory behind RPM and the EU court's approach to object restrictions, it argues that the recent widening of the object analysis and the concomitant blurring of the object and effect categories may aid EU competition law to reconceptualise the approach to minimum RPM.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/f8e68ea4-f75d-404e-9510-4945ee9325e0
- author
- Ioannidou, Maria and Nowag, Julian LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2015
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Per se illegality, RPM, minimum RPM, object and effect distinction, effects-analysis, cartels, anti-competitive object, anti-competitive effect, object restrictions, competition law, private law, Konkurrensrätt, avtal om prisbindning, effektanalys, karteller, civilrätt
- in
- European Competition Journal
- volume
- 11
- issue
- 2/3
- pages
- 27 pages
- publisher
- Taylor & Francis
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85011807489
- ISSN
- 1744-1056
- DOI
- 10.1080/17441056.2015.1080044
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- f8e68ea4-f75d-404e-9510-4945ee9325e0
- date added to LUP
- 2016-06-27 13:52:06
- date last changed
- 2022-02-24 12:58:22
@article{f8e68ea4-f75d-404e-9510-4945ee9325e0, abstract = {{Minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) agreements constitute hard-core vertical restraints and are treated as object restrictions in EU competition law. This article suggests that the time may have come where this approach is revised. After, first, discussing the economic theory behind RPM and the EU court's approach to object restrictions, it argues that the recent widening of the object analysis and the concomitant blurring of the object and effect categories may aid EU competition law to reconceptualise the approach to minimum RPM.}}, author = {{Ioannidou, Maria and Nowag, Julian}}, issn = {{1744-1056}}, keywords = {{Per se illegality; RPM; minimum RPM; object and effect distinction; effects-analysis; cartels; anti-competitive object; anti-competitive effect; object restrictions; competition law; private law; Konkurrensrätt; avtal om prisbindning; effektanalys; karteller; civilrätt}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{2/3}}, pages = {{340--366}}, publisher = {{Taylor & Francis}}, series = {{European Competition Journal}}, title = {{Can two wrongs make it right? Reconsidering minimum resale price maintenance in the light of Allianz Hungaria}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17441056.2015.1080044}}, doi = {{10.1080/17441056.2015.1080044}}, volume = {{11}}, year = {{2015}}, }