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Incumbency advantages, Prime Minister replacements and government formation

Bäck, Hanna LU orcid ; Debus, Marc and Imre, Michael (2025) In Party Politics
Abstract

Are incumbent cabinets favored when a new government forms in parliamentary democracies? This article develops and evaluates a new hypothesis on the so-called incumbency advantage in government formation which stresses the role of interpersonal relations in coalition bargaining. We propose that the Prime Minister (PM) plays a particularly important role in bargaining and suggest that when the PM is replaced, the incumbency advantage will be weakened because the familiarity and trust between the bargaining actors is reduced. We evaluate this argument by studying 127 government formation processes in the German States between 1990 and 2023. The findings support our theoretical argument. Governments that form in the German states are more... (More)

Are incumbent cabinets favored when a new government forms in parliamentary democracies? This article develops and evaluates a new hypothesis on the so-called incumbency advantage in government formation which stresses the role of interpersonal relations in coalition bargaining. We propose that the Prime Minister (PM) plays a particularly important role in bargaining and suggest that when the PM is replaced, the incumbency advantage will be weakened because the familiarity and trust between the bargaining actors is reduced. We evaluate this argument by studying 127 government formation processes in the German States between 1990 and 2023. The findings support our theoretical argument. Governments that form in the German states are more likely to be incumbent cabinets, in particular when there was no PM replacement. Bargaining duration is also significantly shorter when the negotiating parties are the incumbent parties, but this effect is significantly weakened when there was a PM replacement.

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Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
; and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
epub
subject
keywords
coalition governments, incumbency advantage, negotiations, political trust, Prime Ministers
in
Party Politics
article number
13540688251344561
publisher
SAGE Publications
external identifiers
  • scopus:105005854460
ISSN
1354-0688
DOI
10.1177/13540688251344561
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
0196be9d-4fd4-4d1c-b109-9878ae362dc6
date added to LUP
2025-09-16 15:14:42
date last changed
2025-09-16 15:15:36
@article{0196be9d-4fd4-4d1c-b109-9878ae362dc6,
  abstract     = {{<p>Are incumbent cabinets favored when a new government forms in parliamentary democracies? This article develops and evaluates a new hypothesis on the so-called incumbency advantage in government formation which stresses the role of interpersonal relations in coalition bargaining. We propose that the Prime Minister (PM) plays a particularly important role in bargaining and suggest that when the PM is replaced, the incumbency advantage will be weakened because the familiarity and trust between the bargaining actors is reduced. We evaluate this argument by studying 127 government formation processes in the German States between 1990 and 2023. The findings support our theoretical argument. Governments that form in the German states are more likely to be incumbent cabinets, in particular when there was no PM replacement. Bargaining duration is also significantly shorter when the negotiating parties are the incumbent parties, but this effect is significantly weakened when there was a PM replacement.</p>}},
  author       = {{Bäck, Hanna and Debus, Marc and Imre, Michael}},
  issn         = {{1354-0688}},
  keywords     = {{coalition governments; incumbency advantage; negotiations; political trust; Prime Ministers}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  publisher    = {{SAGE Publications}},
  series       = {{Party Politics}},
  title        = {{Incumbency advantages, Prime Minister replacements and government formation}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/13540688251344561}},
  doi          = {{10.1177/13540688251344561}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}