Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets
(2021) In American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13(1). p.338-373- Abstract
- This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation which maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable agents have specific... (More)
- This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation which maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/0b4acf2e-5004-452a-b8fa-63bf62088e2a
- author
- Andersson, Tommy LU ; Csehz, Ágnes ; Ehlers, Lars and Erlanson, Albin
- organization
- publishing date
- 2021
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- market design, time banking, priority mechanism, non-manipulability
- in
- American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- volume
- 13
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 23 pages
- publisher
- American Economic Association
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85099985251
- ISSN
- 1945-7669
- DOI
- 10.1257/mic.20180236
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 0b4acf2e-5004-452a-b8fa-63bf62088e2a
- date added to LUP
- 2020-05-18 20:22:51
- date last changed
- 2022-06-23 04:04:49
@article{0b4acf2e-5004-452a-b8fa-63bf62088e2a,
abstract = {{This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation which maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs.}},
author = {{Andersson, Tommy and Csehz, Ágnes and Ehlers, Lars and Erlanson, Albin}},
issn = {{1945-7669}},
keywords = {{market design; time banking; priority mechanism; non-manipulability}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{1}},
pages = {{338--373}},
publisher = {{American Economic Association}},
series = {{American Economic Journal: Microeconomics}},
title = {{Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets}},
url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/79727977/MTDP1818.pdf}},
doi = {{10.1257/mic.20180236}},
volume = {{13}},
year = {{2021}},
}