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Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets

Andersson, Tommy LU ; Csehz , Ágnes ; Ehlers, Lars and Erlanson, Albin (2020) In American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Abstract
This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation which maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable agents have specific... (More)
This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation which maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
in press
subject
keywords
market design, time banking, priority mechanism, non-manipulability
in
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
pages
23 pages
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
0b4acf2e-5004-452a-b8fa-63bf62088e2a
date added to LUP
2020-05-18 20:22:51
date last changed
2020-05-19 13:12:34
@article{0b4acf2e-5004-452a-b8fa-63bf62088e2a,
  abstract     = {This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation which maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs. },
  author       = {Andersson, Tommy and Csehz , Ágnes   and Ehlers, Lars and Erlanson, Albin },
  language     = {eng},
  month        = {05},
  series       = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
  title        = {Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets},
  url          = {https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/ws/files/79727977/MTDP1818.pdf},
  year         = {2020},
}